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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays in Education and Labor Economics
By
Brittany Bass
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California, Irvine, 2019
Professor David Neumark, Chair
This dissertation examines how sex education mandates affect teenage sexual behaviors
and health, how an introduction of a paid parental leave scheme affects maternal labor
market outcomes, and how school-level technology investment impacts student achievement.
The data used for this dissertation include publicly available student-level data, confidential
micro-data from the Australian government, and publicly available school-level data from the
California Department of Education. The empirical methods used in this dissertation include
difference-in-difference models, and regression discontinuity models. In the first chapter, I
show that state-mandated school-based sex education has no significant impact on teenage
sexual behaviors, gonorrhea rates, or birth rates. In the second chapter, I develop theoretical
predictions of the impact of an introduction of a paid parental leave scheme on maternal
labor market outcomes in Australia, and empirically test these predictions. I find no evidence
that Australia’s paid parental leave scheme impacted maternal labor market outcomes in the
short-run. In the third chapter, I examine the impact of school-level technology investment
on student achievement in California, and find positive effects on English test scores. I
find that the effects are largest for middle schoolers, and are concentrated among the low-
socioeconomic students, suggesting that technology investment can help narrow the income
achievement gap.
xiii
Chapter 1
Let’s Talk About Sex Education: The
Effect of State-Mandated
School-Based Sex Education on
Teenage Sexual Behaviors and Health
1
1.1 Introduction
In the mid-1980s, once it was recognized that AIDS could be spread via sexual intercourse,
Surgeon General Everett Koop called for increased sex education in schools beginning as
early as the third grade (Cornblatt, 2009). By the late 1980s and 1990s, many states started
implementing HIV and Sexually Transmitted Disease (STD) education and sex education
due to concerns over HIV and teenage pregnancy. As the level of concern over HIV/STDs
and teenage pregnancy steadily increased, states continued to implement and encourage
sex education (Carter, 2001). As of 2018, 24 states and Washington DC mandate school-
based sex education. There is, however, considerable heterogeneity in the timing and com-
prehensiveness of these mandates. For example, some states’ sex education programs are
comprehensive in nature, meaning they require information on adolescent development, con-
ception and pregnancy, abstinence and contraception effectiveness, while others are solely
abstinence-based (Mullinax et al., 2017).
Despite the potential benefits of sex education, these classes remain controversial. The debate
over school-based sex education in the United States is centered on two major questions: do
schools have a responsibility to teach students about issues related to sex, and if schools do
teach sex education, what type of information should be presented? That is, what type of sex
education is most effective at preventing teen pregnancy, and reducing disease transmission,
for example. Using data from the Youth Risk Behavioral Surveys, National Vital Statistics,
and the Center for Disease Control’s Wonder statistics on STDs, this study presents the first
examination of the effect of state-level sex education mandates on teenage sexual behaviors,
teenage gonorrhea rates and teenage birth rates.
The primary goal of school-based sex education is to help young people build a foundation
to mature into sexually healthy adults by assisting them in understanding a positive view of
sexuality, providing them with information and skills for taking care of their sexual health,
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and promoting youth to make sound decisions now and in the future (Bridges & Hauser,
2014). As evidenced by the Surgeon General’s call, sex education programs are also viewed as
an informational policy tool intended to reduce the future costs of STDs and teen pregnancy
(Sabia, 2006).
Sexually transmitted diseases are a severe public health problem in the United States. STDs
cause harmful, often irreversible, and costly complications, especially among females (We-
instock et al., 2004). There are approximately 20 million new STD infections each year.
Nearly half of these infections are among young people ages 15 to 24, who represent only
twenty-five percent of the sexually active population (Weinstock et al., 2004). The estimated
cost to the US health care system from these new infections is $16 billion annually, includ-
ing HIV and HPV (human papillomavirus) diagnoses (Workowski & Bolan, 2015). Among
the non-viral STDs, chlamydia and gonorrhea are the most common and costly infections,
estimated at almost $517 million and $162 million in annual health care costs, respectively
(Owusu-Edusei Jr et al., 2013).
Likewise, the economic costs of teenage childbearing may be sizable, especially for taxpayers
and society as a whole. Several studies have found that teen childbearing is associated with
declines in human capital attainment or future earnings for the teen mother (J. D. Angrist &
Evans, 1999; Bronars & Grogger, 1994; Fletcher & Wolfe, 2009; Kane et al., 2013). Fletcher &
Wolfe (2012) examine the consequences of teenage fatherhood by comparing young fathers
to men whose partners miscarried, and find that teenage fatherhood decreased years of
schooling and the likelihood of receiving a high school diploma, and had mixed short-term
effects on young fathers’ labor market outcomes. Evidence also suggests that the children of
teenage mothers tend to fare poorly (i.e. lower cognitive development, academic achievement,
health, behavior, etc.) compared to children born to older mothers (Hoffman & Maynard,
2008). The causal link between the effect of teen childbearing on the children is questioned
due to these studies simply comparing children born to teenagers to children born to older
3
individuals.
Given the public health and economic implications of teenage STD infections and births,
it is important to understand the role sex education plays, if any, in reducing these occur-
rences. Several empirical studies have examined the relationship between sex education and
teenage sexual behaviors and health. The most convincing studies implement randomized
control trials (RCTs) to examine the impact of sex education. Bennett & Assefi (2005) con-
duct a review of all RCTs of school-based teen pregnancy prevention programs from 1980 to
2002. Among the 16 studies reviewed, 3 examined abstinence-only programs, 12 examined
abstinence-plus programs (which provide information about contraception), and 1 compared
an abstinence-only with an abstinence-plus program. Abstinence-only programs had no sta-
tistically significant effect on the frequency of sexual intercourse, number of sexual partners,
contraception use, or pregnancy.1 However, the majority of abstinence-plus programs ana-
lyzed significantly increased rates of contraception use in teens, with mixed results on the
frequency of sexual activity.2 Jemmott et al. (2010) is the one study that conducts a RCT
which directly compares the effect of an abstinence-only intervention to comprehensive inter-
ventions on youth sexual behaviors. The authors find that the abstinence-only intervention
reduced the probability of sexual intercourse, but had no effect on condom use, while the
comprehensive interventions reduced reports of having multiple sexual partners. Although
the RCT results of the effect of sex education on teenage sexual behaviors can be interpreted
as causal, most of the RCTs were targeted toward at-risk populations, therefore lacking
external validity.
Studies using a quasi-experimental approach to assess the impact of sex education have
generally found no evidence that sex education significantly impacts teenage sexual behaviors
and health. Sabia (2006) uses data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent
1The one exception is Jorgensen et al. (1993) who find that abstinence-only programs increased the age of
sexual initiation.
2See DiCenso et al. (2002); Kirby (2008) for an additional review of sex education RCTs.
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Health and finds that the causal link between sex education and adverse health outcomes
disappears after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity via fixed effects and instrumental
variables. Carr & Packham (2016) use a difference-in-difference design to estimate the effect
of state-level abstinence education mandates on teen health outcomes. The authors find that
the abstinence education mandates have no effect on teen birth rates or abortion rates, and
may potentially affect teen STD rates in some states. Additionally, Cannonier (2012) uses
state-level data to analyze the effect of the Title V, Section 510 State Abstinence Education
(SAE) on 15-17 year old birth rates. The author finds that for an average state, increasing
spending by $50,000/year on SAE can help avoid approximately four teenage births. Kearney
& Levine (2015) also use a difference-in-difference design to determine the role of state-level
demographic changes, economic conditions, and targeted policies on recent trends in the
US teen birth rate. The authors control for state-level sex education curriculum and sex
education curriculums requiring the teaching of contraception in their model, and find that
these policies have no effect on the teen birth rate.
This study contributes to the existing quasi-experimental literature on sex education in sev-
eral important ways. First, I exploit within-state variation in state-mandated school-based
sex education from 1997-2013 to estimate the effect on teenage sexual behaviors, gonorrhea
rates, and birth rates. Importantly, this is the first paper to simultaneously estimate the
effect of three types of state-mandated sex education - abstinence-based, comprehensive,
and unspecified3- which allows me to directly compare the effects of each type of education
on teenage sexual behaviors and health. Second, I am the first to examine the effect of
sex education on teenage sexual behaviors using data drawn from repeated cross-sections of
both the National and State Youth Risk Behavior Surveys (YRBS) from 1997 to 2013. The
use of individual-level data allows me to estimate the “first-stage” effect of sex education
mandates on measures of teenage sexual behaviors, such as sexual activity, condom use or
3Unspecified sex education refers to states that enact a sex education mandate but do not specify the type
of sex education that is to be taught.
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contraception use at last sex, and multiple sexual partners. Finally, this study is one of the
first to credibly explore whether the effect of school-based sex education extends to teenage
gonorrhea rates, an outcome that has both private and public health consequences.
Difference-in-difference results show that any state-mandated sex education does not signif-
icantly impact teenage sexual behaviors. Additionally, difference-in-difference-in-difference
results, which leverage 20-24 year olds as a within-state control group, show no effect on
teenage gonorrhea or birth rates. Exploring sex education policy heterogeneity, difference-in-
difference estimates suggest that comprehensive sex education significantly decreases teenage
condom use, and unspecified sex education decreases female birth control pill use, and in-
creases engaging with multiple sexual partners. This negative effect of sex education on
teenage sexual behaviors does not translate to unfavorable sexual health outcomes, as sex
education has no significant impact on teenage gonorrhea or birth rates. However, the het-
erogeneous results are interpreted with caution due to variation and classification issues.
1.2 Background on school-based sex education
Support for sex education began in the late 1800s when mass public campaigns promoted the
“regulation of sexuality” and emphasized risk-reduction practices and health care prevention
in response to cholera and syphilis epidemics (Irvine, 2004). Momentum continued through-
out the early and mid-1900s, until opposition towards sex education began to be organized
by groups such as the John Birch Society, Christian Crusade, and Parents Opposed to Sex
and Sensitivity Education (Scales, 1981).4 By the early 1970s, twenty states had voted to
restrict or abolish sex education.
As mentioned above, the 1980s brought renewed interest in sex education as a result of
4These groups argued that sex education was “smut”, “immoral”, and “a filthy communist plot” (Scales,
1981).
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concerns over teen pregnancy and HIV/AIDS that motivated widespread public support for
sex education in schools (SIECUS, 2010). As a response, the Reagan administration began
federal funding for abstinence-only-until-marriage programs, which gained momentum during
the 1990s and early 2000s, and has served as a strong incentive for states to adopt this type of
curriculum. Since 1997, Congress has provided over $1.5 billion for abstinence-only programs
(SIECUS, 2010).
Federal funds for such programs began easing after a report by Mathematica Policy Research
was released in 2007 that found abstinence-only programs had no effect on sexual behavior
outcomes (Trenholm et al., 2007).5 In 2014, at the request of the Obama administration,
Congress provided $185 million for medically accurate and age-appropriate sex education
programs. In his proposed federal budget for 2017, former President Obama removed all
funding for abstinence-only education.6 Additionally, many states have responded to parents’
and communities’ calls to provide education on not only abstinence, but on comprehensive
topics, like contraception, STDs, HIV, and the proper use of condoms (Bleakley et al., 2006).
Although the federal government has provided funding for public and private sex education
programs, there is no federal law or policy that requires sex education to be taught in schools.
Rather, the decision to mandate school-based sex education is left up to the state and local
school districts7. Many states that have mandated sex education in schools have developed
curriculum or guidelines for local school districts to aid with the implementation of sex
education (Donovan, 1998).8
5The Mathematica study examines the effect of four Title V, Section 510 grants: My Choice, My Future;
ReCapturing the Vision; Families United to Prevent Teen Pregnancy; and Teens in Control, on teens’ sexual
abstinence, their risks of pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases, and other behavioral outcomes.
6Federal funding for abstinence-only programs included funding for the Community-Based Abstinence Edu-
cation grant program and the abstinence-only funding granted as part of the Adolescent Family Life Act,
among others. Funding under the Obama administration was slated for “competitive contracts and grants
to public and private entities to fund medically accurate and age appropriate programs that reduce teen
pregnancy”(111th Congress, 2009).
7It may be that some states that do not mandate all schools to teach sex education have some school
districts within the state that do. If this is the case, then the estimates presented in this study will be
biased downward. Unfortunately, district-level data on sex education mandates and the outcomes of interest
are not available.
8To take some examples, in 1997, the Hawaii legislature adopted a resolution to improve professional training
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1.3 Conceptual Framework
According to the National Sexuality Education Standards (NSES), a representative school-
based sex education mandate should include information on seven key components: anatomy
and physiology, puberty and adolescent development, identity, pregnancy and reproduction,
STDs and HIV, healthy relationships, and personal safety (Barr et al., 2014). However, the
general requirements for school-based sex education courses vary significantly across states.
Some states require abstinence-based sex education, which stresses or covers the importance
of abstinence until marriage and may include some information on contraceptives, such as
contraception types and failure rates. Other states are comprehensive in nature, meaning
they provide information that is closely aligned with NSES’s seven components.
How might school-based sex education affect teenage sexual behavior? Oettinger (1999) was
the first study to develop a theoretical model of a teen’s decision to be sexually active. His
framework suggests that rational individuals become sexually active at the age at which the
perceived benefits from sexual intercourse surpass the perceived costs (Oettinger, 1999).9
If sex education teaches teenagers about the costs associated with pregnancy and sexually
transmitted diseases, including mental, physical, and monetary costs, their expected costs
and benefits of engaging in sexual behaviors may be altered. However, it is important to
note that teenagers may not be making rational decisions when deciding whether or not to
in sex education and requires all health teachers be certified to teach health, take five continuing education
classes in health-related areas (including teenage pregnancy, STD and HIV prevention), and be evaluated
by students (Hawaii Legislature, House Resolution No. 32). In April 2012, the District of Columbia im-
plemented the District of Columbia Comprehensive Assessment System (DC CAS) for Health and Physical
Education. DC CAS is the first statewide standardized test that measures students’ proficiency in physical
education, sexual health, nutrition, and other health related topics (Office of the State Superintendent of
Education, 2017). In 2010, North Carolina updated their abstinence-only-until-marriage sex education law
to the “Healthy Youth Act”, which required schools to provide sex education that was more closely aligned
with parent opinion and public health best practices. The Healthy Youth Act provided clear content re-
quirements that all schools must teach, resources for schools to aid in curriculum selection, and teacher
training in general teaching skills and specific curriculum related to sex education.
9Oettinger (1999) uses data from the NLSY and finds that enrollment in sex education was associated
with earlier sexual activity for females, and earlier pregnancy for women with fewer sources of alternative
information.
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engage in sexual activities, but that does not mean they will not respond in some way to
sex education. Sex education should affect teens’ perceptions about sex and their sexual
behaviors to the extent that it reinforces existing information, and/or presents new infor-
mation. Specifically, teens may already know some, or perhaps all, of the information being
presented in a sex education course, but receiving the information again may change their
sexual behaviors more or less than receiving the information for the first time.10 Addition-
ally, new information could be presented in multiple ways, and in practice typically takes
one of two forms: abstinence-based or comprehensive.
Abstinence-based sex education typically stresses the following: students should abstain from
sexual activity until after marriage; abstinence from sex is the only 100% effective way to
avoid unwanted pregnancy, STDs and HIV; conceiving a child out of wedlock is likely to
have harmful consequences for the child, the child’s parents and society; and failure rates
associated with condom use (Alford, 2001). Although abstinence-based sex education may
include information about contraceptives, details regarding their appropriate use is not pro-
vided or encouraged. On the other hand, comprehensive sex education courses tend to be
age-appropriate, and include information on topics like human development, relationships,
decision making, abstinence, contraception, and disease prevention (Alford, 2001). Compre-
hensive sex education may also include information about how to access and properly use
contraception. Consequently, abstinence-based sex education should decrease the level of
sexual activity more than comprehensive sex education, but may also lead to a relatively
lower take-up of contraception among teens who are sexually active. Thus, the net effect of
abstinence-based sex education on teenage birth and STD rates is ambiguous. If the level
of sexual activity decreases among teens who receive abstinence-based education, then teen
10Several studies have shown that sex education programs have increased teenagers’ existing knowledge about
sexual health issues (Eisen & Zellman, 1986; Kim et al., 1997; Reichelt & Werley, 1975; Sanderson, 2000).
Kim et al. (1997) and Dupas (2011) find that sex education programs not only increase teens’ knowledge
about sex, but also affect their sexual behaviors. Additionally, Wilkinson et al. (2006) examine the corre-
lation between the quality of sex education initiatives in the United Kingdom and teenage conceptions and
abortions and find that teenage conceptions declined after the implementation of the teenage pregnancy
strategy.
9
birth and STD rates may decrease. But, if abstinence-based education decreases contra-
ceptive use, then teen birth and STD rates may increase. Similarly, if comprehensive sex
education promotes information about contraception, it may lead to increases in sexual ac-
tivity along with increases in contraception use. Again, the net effect on teenage birth and
STD rates is ambiguous. If teens are engaging in sexual activity more, then birth and STD
rates may increase, but if contraception use among sexually active teens is also increasing,
then teenage birth and STD rates may decrease.11 By having information on teenage sexual
behaviors, as well as teenage birth and STD rates, this paper is able to shed light on how
each form of sex education affects teen sexual behaviors and health.
Recall that sex education should affect teens’ sexual behaviors to the extent that it reinforces
existing information and/or presents new information. Sex education should have a greater
impact on teens who gain a lot of new information, such as teens without low-cost alternative
sources of sexual information (Oettinger, 1999). Older teenagers, age 16 and up, are more
likely to have a drivers license, a job, and potentially more access to the internet and media,
all of which can provide more opportunities to engage in sexual activity. Additionally, males
and females may respond differently to sex education. Indeed, Measor (1996) finds that boys
and girls respond differently to sex education, and that boys react more negatively, by either
being more disruptive or having the teacher’s attention diverted more towards them, than
girls.
11Alternatively, improper use of contraception by teens could actually increase STD and birth rates. Buckles
& Hungerman (2016) analyze the fertility effects of teenagers’ access to condoms via condom distribution
programs in schools and find that access to condoms in schools increases teen fertility by about 10 percent,
with the effect driven by communities where condoms are provided without mandated counseling.
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1.4 Data and Measures
1.4.1 Data
My primary analysis will use data drawn from three sources. First, I use repeated cross-
sections of both the National and State Youth Risk Behavior Surveys (YRBS) from 1997
to 2013. The National and State YRBS surveys are conducted biennially by the Center for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and administered to high school students in grades
9 through 12 during the spring.12The National YRBS, when weighted, is representative of
the population of U.S. high school students.13 While the state surveys are coordinated by
the CDC, they are usually conducted by state education and health agencies.14 Specifically,
trained data collectors travel to each participating school and administer the survey, in ad-
dition to collecting information about schools and classrooms.15 The YRBS questionnaires
assess six categories of youth health behaviors: unintentional injuries and violence, sexual
behaviors, alcohol and other drug use, tobacco use, unhealthy dietary behaviors, and in-
adequate physical activity. Due to the sensitivity of the survey material, data collection
procedures for the YRBS are designed to protect student privacy by allowing for anonymous
and voluntary participation (Eaton et al., 2012).16 Given the self-reported nature of the sur-
12High schools are selected to participate with probability proportional to the size of student enrollment,
and then by required classes, like English, or by a specific class period of the school day (e.g. 2nd period)
for all grades 9-12, and within the selected class or period, all students are eligible to participate (Eaton
et al., 2012).
13Robustness checks of the results to omitting the National YRBS, which is not meant to be state repre-
sentative, are presented in Table 1.10. The results are quantitatively and qualitatively very similar to the
main results presented in Table 1.2, Panel III.
14The augmentation of national with state YRBS data has been employed in a number of recent studies
examining the effects of many state-level public policies, including cigarette taxes (Hansen et al., 2013),
medical marijuana laws (Anderson et al., 2015), anti-bullying laws (Sabia & Bass, 2016), and parental
involvement laws for abortion (Sabia & Anderson, 2014), on risky behaviors.
15However, in some states, the questionnaires are mailed to the school and administered by the teacher of
the selected class or period, then mailed to the agency conducting the survey.
16Participating students record their answers to the self-administered survey during the selected class or
period on computer-scannable answer sheets, and are encouraged to use an extra sheet of paper provided
by the data collector to cover their responses as they complete the survey. And to the extent possible, desks
are spread throughout the classroom to ensure additional privacy while completing the survey (Eaton et
al., 2012).
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vey, one might be worried about the reliability of the data. Brener et al. (1995) and Brener
et al. (2002) test the reliability of the YRBS questionnaires and find that students appear to
report risky health behaviors reliably over time. Thus, the YRBS provides individual-level
data that is well suited for this study because it contains several measures of student sexual
behaviors, including sexual activity, condom and contraception use, and information on the
number of sexual partners a respondent has had.
Using the YRBS data, I identify four key measures of teenage sexual activity. First, I
create an indicator equal to one if the student indicated they had sex within the last three
months, and zero otherwise.17 Nearly 34 percent of the sample indicated they have had
sex within the past 3 months (see Table 1.1). Next, respondents were asked about condom
and contraception use the last time they had sex.18 I operationalize this by creating binary
variables to measure male and female condom use and female birth control pill use at last
sex. Both condom and birth control pill use are conditional on having sex within the past
3 months, and birth control pill use is measured only for female respondents. The birth
control pill use outcome is limited only to females because self-reports of contraceptive use
by females is considered more accurate than self-reports by males (Brauner-Otto et al., 2012;
Steiner et al., 2016). According to the sample, Table 1.1 shows that 56 percent of respondents
indicated using a condom at last sex, while 22 percent of females used birth control pills at
last sex. Finally, respondents were asked about their number of sexual partners within the
past 3 months.19 I create a binary variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports having sex
17Specifically, the survey question asks “During the past 3 months, with how many people did you have
sexual intercourse?”. Respondents’ choices were (i) I have never had sexual intercourse, (ii) I have had
sexual intercourse, but not during the past 3 months, (iii) 1 person, (iv) 2 people, (v) 3 people, (vi) 4
people, (vii) 5 people, (viii) 6 or more people. Students were coded as having had sex within the last 3
months if they chose any response in (iii)-(viii).
18Specifically, the survey questions asks “The last time you had sexual intercourse, did you or your partner
use a condom”, and “The last time you had sexual intercourse, what one method did you or your partner
use to prevent pregnancy?”. Regarding the latter, respondents could choose between (i) no method, (ii)
birth control pills, (iii) condoms, (iv) Depo-Provera, (v) withdrawal, (vi) some other method, or (vii) not
sure.
19Specifically, the survey question asks ”During the past 3 months, with how many people have you had
sexual intercourse?” Respondents’ choices were (i) I have never had sexual intercourse, (ii) I have had
sexual intercourse, but not during the past 3 months, (iii) 1 person, (iv) 2 people, (v) 3 people, (vi) 4
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with more than 1 person within the past 3 months, and 0 otherwise. I find that 27 percent
of the sample reported having sex with more than 1 person within the past 3 months.
Though the YRBS has rich individual-level data on sexual behaviors, the survey does not ask
students questions regarding sexually transmitted diseases, pregnancy, and the outcome of
a pregnancy if one occurred. Additionally, each of the above measures of sexual behavior is
self-reported. If sex education mandates prompt more students to be willing to report their
sexual behavior, then estimated effects of sex education mandates may be biased upward.
Furthermore, STDs, pregnancy, and pregnancy outcomes are likely relatively low frequency
events in the YRBS, so measures of incidence might be inaccurate. To supplement the self-
reported measures of student sexual behaviors, I augment the YRBS analysis with objective
STD and birth rate data. State-level gonorrhea rates for 15-19 year olds per 1,000 individ-
uals for 1997-2013 were obtained from the CDC’s STD Surveillance Data20. According to
Table 1.1, the reported gonorrhea rate per 1,000 individuals is 4.1, with the female teenage
gonorrhea rate being slightly higher with nearly 5.8 diagnoses per 1,000, and nearly 2.6 diag-
noses per 1,000 for teenage males. Gonorrhea is the second most commonly reported STD in
the United States, and since 2009, gonorrhea rates have been increasing among adolescents
and young adults (CDC, 2015a). These data are derived from information from the official
statistics for the reported occurrence of nationally notifiable STDs in the United States,
test positivity and prevalence data from numerous prevalence monitoring initiatives, sen-
tinel surveillance, and national health care services surveys (CDC, 2015b). The CDC’s STD
Surveillance Data only accounts for reported STDs. If sex education induces changes in STD
testing rates, which in turn accounts for changes in STD rates, then the estimated results
will be biased (Carr & Packham, 2016). This is especially true for chlamydia rates since the
disease is typically asymptomatic, and increases in testing rates will surely lead to increases
people, (vii) 5 people, (viii) 6 or more people.
20STD data is available here: https://wonder.cdc.gov/std.html. State-level gonorrhea rates per 1,000 indi-
viduals were calculated using counts of gonorrhea reports to teenagers aged 15-19 divided by the population
of teenagers aged 15-19, then multiplied by 1,000.
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in diagnoses. In fact, the CDC reports that recent increases in chlamydia rates are likely due
to expanded screening and not an increase in the disease (CDC, 2009). Gonorrhea rates, on
the other hand, are less subject to this concern (CDC, 2009), and are widely accepted as the
preferred measure in the prior literature that analyzes public policy and STDs (Durrance,
2013).
Since data on pregnancies and the outcome of such pregnancies is not available in the YRBS,
I obtain state-level birth rates for 15 to 19 year old females for the years 1997-2013 from
the National Center for Health Statistics, Division of Vital Statistics Natality Files.21 State-
level birth rates per 1,000 individuals were calculated using the number of births to female
teenagers aged 15-19 divided by the population of female teenagers aged 15-19, then multi-
plied by 1,000. The teenage birth rate for the sample period according to Table 1.1 is 39.6
births per 1,000 individuals. In the United States, state laws require birth certificates to be
completed for all births, and Federal law mandates national collection and publication of
births and other vital statistics data (CDC, 2015b).
1.4.2 Sex Education Mandates
I begin by generating a binary sex education variable that measures whether a state had
enacted and was enforcing a sex education mandate. Information about sex education ef-
fective dates was obtained from two sources. Policy information from 1997 to 2000 for each
state was retrieved from numerous volumes of the SIECUS (Sexuality Information and Ed-
ucation Council of the United States) Report. The SIECUS Report was published from
1972 to 2005, and includes scholarly articles, opinion pieces, policy information, and other
works regarding sexuality information and education. Sex education mandates from 2001
to 2013 were collected from the Guttmacher Institute State Policies in Brief: Sex and HIV
21Sex education could also affect teenage abortion rates likely through changes in the number of unintended
pregnancies. However, abortion data for teenagers is not available on a consistent basis for all US states
and for the sample years in this study.
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Education publications, which contain detailed sex education policy information at the state
level. The two sources of information were both available for the years 2001 to 2005, and
the Guttmacher Institute reports were relied upon since they were published on a more con-
sistent basis. Figure 1.1 presents the effective year for each state’s sex education mandate
from 1997-2013. It is important to note that variation in sex education mandates not only
comes from states enacting a sex education mandate, but also from states repealing their
sex education mandate during the sample period. In Figure 1.1, states marked with an “*”
enacted a sex education mandate, and states marked with a “ˆ” repealed a sex education
mandate. Throughout the sample period, 31 states mandated sex education, with 12 states
enacting sex education, 6 state repealing sex education, and 15 states requiring sex education
during the full sample period.22
Given the substantial heterogeneity in the type of sex education mandate enacted by each
state, SIECUS Reports and the Guttmacher Institute (GI) categorize these mandates by
their comprehensiveness and requirements. Given the debate among policymakers about
what type of sex education should be offered in schools, identifying the most effective type of
sex education, whether it be abstinence-based or more comprehensive in nature, is critical.
I use the SIECUS and GI reports from 1997-2013 to indicate whether a state mandating
sex education requires abstinence-based, comprehensive sex education, or “unspecified” sex
education. Unspecified sex education refers to states that enact a sex education mandate
but do not specify the type of sex education that is to be taught. Generally, when states do
not specify the type of education to be taught, the curriculum offered often depends on the
teacher’s ability, training, and comfort with the subject matter (Donovan, 1998). Specifically,
the SIECUS Reports and GI State Policies in Brief indicate whether a state that mandates
sex education either cover or stress abstinence, and whether the state’s mandate also requires
coverage of contraception. I generate binary indicators for abstinence-based, comprehensive,
and unspecified sex education that measure whether a state enacting a sex education mandate
22Florida and West Virginia both enacted and repealed a sex education mandate during 1997-2013.
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requires the teaching of abstinence-based, comprehensive or unspecified education. A state is
considered to have an abstinence-based curriculum if the state’s mandate requires schools to
cover or stress abstinence, with no requirement to cover contraception. A state is considered
to have a comprehensive curriculum if the state’s mandate requires schools to cover or
stress abstinence, and cover contraception.23 Fourteen states that mandate sex education
throughout the sample period provide abstinence-based education, while 16 states mandating
sex education require a comprehensive curriculum, and 10 states mandated sex education
without providing detail on the type of education to be taught (see Figure 1.2).24
1.5 Empirical Approach
My econometric approach will estimate a reduced form difference-in-difference model (DD)
that takes the form:
Yist = α + β1SexEdst−1 + δ′Xist + γ′Zst + θs + τt + ist (1.1)
where i indexes the individual, s indexes the respondent’s state, and t indexes the survey
year. Yist is a measure of individual teenage sexual behavior, including sexual intercourse in
the past 3 months, condom use during last sex, female birth control pill use during last sex,
and having multiple sexual partners.25 SexEdst−1 is an indicator for whether a sex education
23States that provide “abstinence-plus” education (stressing abstinence education but also covering contra-
ception, are coded as “comprehensive” states. Table 1.13 shows the results collapsing “abstinence-plus”
with abstinence instead of comprehensive.
24It is important to note that although 14 states provided abstinence-based education, 16 provided com-
prehensive, and 10 provided unspecified education, some states provided more than 1 type of education
throughout the sample period (see Figure 1.2). For example, Minnesota had a sex education mandate
throughout the sample period, and enforced abstinence-based education only from 2011 onwards, while
prior to 2011 did not specify the type of sex education that was to be taught. Thus, Minnesota is counted
as having provided abstinence-based education, as well as unspecified education.
25Gonorrhea and birth rates are obtained at the state level, thus Equation 1 can be modified as: Yst =
α+β1SexEdst−1 + γ′Zst + θs + τt + st. This modification can be carried over to all subsequent equations
where gonorrhea and birth rates are the main outcomes of interest. The vector Z includes state-level
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mandate was in effect in state s in year t− 1. Since the YRBS is typically administered in
the spring of each survey year, and sex education mandates passed during a calendar year
likely are not implemented by schools until the start of the school year (i.e. in August or
September, months after the YRBS has been administered), I lag the sex education policy
variable to better align the timing of the sexual behavior and health outcomes with the
effective date of the policy. The vector X includes individual level controls, such as age,
race, gender, and grade level; the vector Z includes state level economic and policy controls,
such as the teenage unemployment rate, per capita income, beer taxes, blood alcohol content
laws, parental involvement laws for abortion, and mandatory wait laws for abortion services.
Finally, θs and τt are state and year fixed effects. Individual-level regressions are weighted
using sample weights provided in the YRBS26, state-level STD regressions are weighted by
the teenage population age 15-19, and state-level birth regressions are weighted by the female
teenage population ages 15-19. Standard errors presented in all tables are clustered at the
state level (Bertrand et al., 2004).
Identification of the parameter of interest, β1, comes from within-state variation in sex
education mandates during the 1997-2013 sample period. Estimates of β1 in Equation 1
will only be unbiased if state-specific time-varying unobservables are uncorrelated with the
adoption of sex education mandates, and if states are not enacting sex education mandates
in response to unfavorable teenage sexual behaviors, STD rates, and birth rates. I pursue
a number of strategies to address the possibility of policy endogeneity. First, I control for
two state-level abortion policies that may have been implemented contemporaneously with
sex education mandates: parental involvement laws for abortion and mandatory wait laws
for abortion services. Second, I test whether sex education mandates were implemented in
response to pre-existing teenage sexual behavior and health trends with the following event
demographic, economic, and policy controls, such as the percent of teenagers who are white, the percent
of teenagers who are black, the teenage unemployment rate, per capita income, beer taxes, blood alcohol
content laws, parental involvement laws for abortion, and mandatory wait laws for abortion services.
26Linear probability models are estimated for the individual-level YRBS data. The results are quantitatively
and qualitatively very similar using a Probit specification, and the results are reported in Table 1.11.
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study specification:
Yist = α+
φ=−2∑
φ≤−6
σφSexEds,t+φ +
µ≥7∑
µ=1
ηµSexEds,t+µ + δ
′Xist + γ′Zst + θs + τt + ist (1.2)
To operationalize the event study, I only use within-state variation from states enacting a sex
education mandate during the 1997-2013 sample period. That is, I drop the six states that
repeal their sex education mandate from the main event study specification, and instead
show event study figures separately for states enacting a sex education mandate, and for
states repealing a sex education mandate, as trends in sexual behaviors and health may
lead states to alter their position on sex education.27 Third, I add state-specific linear time
trends to Equation 1 to control for unmeasured state trends unfolding linearly. Fourth, I
pool 15-19 year old and 20-24 year old gonorrhea and birth rates and estimate a difference-
in-difference-in-difference model (DDD), where the 20-24 year olds are used as a within-state
control group to net out trends that may differentially affect treated and control states.28
Finally, I conduct a placebo test on a number of health-related outcomes that should be
unaffected by state-mandated sex education.
To capture heterogeneity across states’ sex education mandates, I also estimate a reduced
form difference-in-difference model similar to Equation 1, and include the policy variables
“Abstinence”, “Comprehensive”, or “Unspecified”, which indicate whether a states’ sex ed-
ucation mandate requires the teaching of abstinence-based education, comprehensive educa-
27In Figure 1.4, I show the event study figures for the states that repeal their sex education mandate. That
is, I drop the states that implement a sex education policy during 1997-2013. There is no evidence of
significant pre-trends in any of the behavior or health outcomes.
28The YRBS does not survey young adults ages 20-24, therefore, the DDD analysis is only performed on
STD and birth rates.
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tion, or unspecified education.
Yist = α+β1Abstst−1+β2Compst−1+β3Unspecifiedst−1+δ′Xist+γ′Zst+θs+τt+ist (1.3)
Identification of the parameters of interest, β1, β2, and β3, come from within-state variation
in state mandates that require abstinence-based, comprehensive, or unspecified sex education
from 1997-2013 (see Figure 1.2).
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Any Sex Education Mandate
Table 1.2 presents the results from Equation 1 for the effect of state-mandated sex education
on measures of teenage sexual behaviors reported in the YRBS. Panel I of Table 1.2 includes
only controls for state and year fixed effects. The estimates suggest that sex education
mandates significantly increase the probability of having sex by 5.8 percent. Sex education
mandates are also associated with increases in condom use, birth control pill use, and having
multiple sexual partners, but none of these estimates are statistically significant. Panel
II includes individual-level demographic controls and state-level controls. The estimates
are fairly robust to the inclusion of controls, although sex education mandates no longer
significantly impact having recent sex.
The results presented in Panels I and II of Table 1.2 could be biased if states are implementing
sex education mandates in response to unfavorable teenage sexual behaviors. I test the
parallel trends assumption of my research strategy by estimating Equation 2 and present
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the results graphically in Figure 1.3. Panels (a) - (d) show the estimates of α from Equation
2 on teenage sexual activity, condom use, female birth control pill use, and multiple sexual
partners, respectively. The points in the plots give the estimate of α, with years 0 to -1
excluded such that all estimates are relative to these years, while the lines extending from
them represent 95% confidence intervals that are calculated using standard errors clustered
at the state level.29 Each figure also includes the F-statistic and p-value from a joint test of
significance on the pre-trends.
If the adoption of sex education mandates has an effect on teenage sexual behaviors before
their implementation, then the results may be driven by unobserved trends (Meer & West,
2015). This does not appear to be the case for sexual activity, female birth control pill use,
or multiple sexual partners, as no evidence of pre-treatment trends are seen in panels (a),
(c), and (d). However, pre-treatment trends do exist for teenage condom use, with panel
(b) showing a decrease in condom use for all years prior to the adoption of sex education
mandates. This suggests that pre-treatment trends in condom use may be correlated with a
states’ adoption of a sex education mandate. However, it is unlikely that policymakers know
about the sexual behaviors of teenagers unless they are familiar with the YRBS results, or
results of similar sexual behavior surveys. Policymakers are more likely to be aware of and
rely on teenage STD and/or birth rate trends in their state when deciding to implement
sex education mandates. Nevertheless, in order to control for the pre-treatment trends in
condom use that may be correlated with a states’ adoption of a sex education mandate, I
augment Equation 1 and include a state-specific linear time trend. The results are presented
in Panel III of Table 3. Similar to Panel II, the estimates all remain statistically insignificant,
and decrease in magnitude, with the exception of multiple partners, with condom use and
birth control pill use becoming slightly negative.
29In the event study figures for the YRBS outcomes, sets of years are grouped together to account for the
biennial nature of the survey, and the variation in sex education enactment year. That is, since the YRBS
is given every odd year, states that enact a sex education mandate in an even year will have data for the
one year lead and lag, three year lead and lag, etc. States that enact a sex education mandate in an odd
year will only have data for the two year lead and lag, four year lead and lag, etc.
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Next, I explore the hypothesis that sex education mandates may not have an immediate
effect on teenage sexual behaviors. The change in sexual behavior seen in Table 1.2 may
take time to unfold due to teens potentially gaining new information or updating their
existing knowledge, eventually changing their behavior, and finding sexual partners. Table
1.3 presents the results for the lagged effects of sex education mandates on teenage sexual
behaviors. Panel I includes all individual and state-level controls, and Panel II includes all
controls plus a state-specific linear time trend. The estimates are similar for each outcome
across both specifications, and suggest that sex education does not significantly impact
teenage sexual behaviors in the short-run or long-run.
While sex education appears to have no effect, on average, on teenage sexual behaviors, I next
explore if there might be heterogeneous effects of sex education by whether a sex education
mandate was enacted, or repealed. Recall Figure 1.1, which shows state-level variation in
sex education mandates from 1997-2013, and indicates the states enacting a sex education
mandate (marked with an “*”), and states repealing a sex education mandate (marked with
a “ˆ”). To test whether an introduction or a repeal of a sex education mandate affects
sexual behaviors differently, I replace SexEds,t−1 in Equation 1 with two dummy variables:
an indicator for a sex education mandate being enacted (SexEd−Ons,t−1), and an indicator
for a sex education mandate being repealed (SexEd− Offs,t−1). The results are presented
in Table 1.14, columns 1-4. The estimates suggest that neither an introduction or repeal of
a sex education mandate differentially effect teenage sexual behaviors (see F-test in Panel
III).30
30I also explore heterogeneous effects by age, teenagers under 16 years old and teenagers 16+ years old,
a typical age cut for state-level age of consent laws. Thirty-one states have an age of consent law of
16 years old, which is the age at which a person’s consent to sexual intercourse is valid in law. The
results are presented in Table 1.12. The estimates show that sex education mandates do not significantly
impact younger or olden teens probability of sexual activity, condom use, or female birth control pill use.
However, there is some evidence that sex education mandates increase the probability of having multiple
sexual partners for older teens by 3.4 percent. Heterogeneous effects by gender are also investigated, and
sex education appears to have no differential effect on sexual behaviors of males and females. The results
are available from the author upon request.
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Although sex education courses may also present information consistent with healthy teenage
behaviors, like the dangers of alcohol and drug consumption, we should not expect to see
an effect of sex education on general teenage health behaviors. As a placebo test, Table
1.9 presents the results for the effect of sex education on watching television for more than
1 hour per day, taking laxatives or vomiting to lose weight, and wearing a bicycle helmet
when riding a bike. The results show that sex education does not significantly effect general
teenage health behaviors, providing additional confidence in the results presented above.
I next present the results for the effect of sex education on objective measures of teenage
health, including teenage gonorrhea and birth rates. Table 1.4 presents the DD (columns 1,
3, and 5) and DDD (columns 2, 4, and 6) results for the effect of sex education mandates on
the log of gonorrhea rates, per 1,000 individuals, for all teenagers, and for male and female
teenagers separately. Panel I includes only state and year fixed effects, Panel II includes
state-level controls, and Panel III includes all controls plus a state-specific linear time trend.
Focusing attention on Panel III and the DD estimates in columns 1, 3, and 5, sex education
appears to decrease teenage gonorrhea rates by 2 to 3 percentage points, but none of the
estimates are statistically distinguishable from zero.31
As noted above, policymakers may be more aware of trends in the teenage STD and/or birth
rates when determining whether or not to mandate sex education. If this is the case, then we
will be more concerned about the validity of the estimates if pre-treatment trends emerge in
teenage STD and birth rates. Figure 1.3 panel (e) shows the estimates of α from Equation 2
on the log of 15-19 year old gonorrhea rates. Gonorrhea rates appear to be slightly trending
upwards, but a joint test of significance on the pre-trends is not statistically different from
zero. To further confirm that gonorrhea rates were not changing systematically prior to
the implementation of sex education mandates, Table 1.4 also presents the estimates from a
31Heterogeneous effects of sex education introduction or repeal on the teenage gonorrhea rate are also
presented in Table 1.14, column 5. The estimates suggest that an introduction of a sex education mandate
marginally reduces teenage gonorrhea rates by 8 percentage points, but the estimate is not significantly
different from the effect of a repeal of a sex education mandate (see F-test in Panel III).
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DDD specification, that uses young adults ages 20-24 as a within-state control group. The
DDD results in Panel III confirm the DD estimates, though slightly larger in absolute value,
and show that sex education does not significantly impact teenage gonorrhea rates.
Table 1.5 presents the DD (column 1) and DDD (column 2) results for the effect of sex
education mandates on the log of the female birth rate, per 1,000 individuals. Table 1.5 also
includes the results for the effect of sex education on the log of the teenage birth rate for
those under 16 years old (column 3) and those ages 16 years old and over (column 4). Panel
I includes only controls for state and year fixed effects, and Panel II adds state-level controls,
and Panel III includes all controls plus a state-specific linear time trend. The DD estimates
in Panel III show very little evidence that sex education is associated with economically or
statistically significant changes in the female birth rate. Similarly, the DDD results, which
use young female adults ages 20-24 as a within-state control group, provide no evidence that
sex education economically or statistically significantly impacts teenage birth rates.32
Again, the validity of the estimates will be threatened if trends in the teenage birth rate
emerge prior to the implementation of a sex education mandate. Figure 1.3 panel (f) shows
the estimates of α from Equation 2 on the log of the teenage female birth rate. Teenage birth
rates do not appear to be significantly trending upwards in the years prior to a sex education
mandate, and a joint test of significance on the pre-trends is not statistically different from
zero.
1.6.2 Exploring Heterogeneity
While the average school-based state sex education mandate appears to have no significant
effect on teenage sexual behaviors or health, I next explore whether there may be hetero-
32Heterogeneous effects of sex education introduction or repeal on the teenage birth rate are also presented
in Table 1.14, column 6. The estimates suggest that neither an introduction nor repeal of a sex education
mandate significantly impact teenage birth rates.
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geneity in the effect of sex education by type of law implemented. Variation in sex education
mandate type is displayed in Figure 1.2. It is clear from Figure 1.2 that many states with
a sex education mandate switched between types of sex education throughout the sample
period. Tables 1.6-1.8 present the results from Equation 3 by type of sex education mandate
on teenage sexual behaviors, teenage gonorrhea rates, and teenage birth rates, respectively,
exploiting all variation in mandates presented in Figure 1.2.
Beginning with the heterogeneous results for the YRBS outcomes, Panel III of Table 1.6
shows that comprehensive and unspecified sex education mandates are associated with in-
creases in risky teenage sexual behaviors. Comprehensive sex education mandates appear
to marginally decrease teenage condom use by 3.25 percent, and unspecified sex education
mandates decrease female teenage birth control pill use by 13.8 percent, and increase sex
with multiple partners by 6.6 percent. Next, I report the results by sex education type on
teenage gonorrhea and birth rates in Tables 1.7 and 1.8, respectively. Panel III, Column 2
(DDD) of Table 1.7 shows no evidence that the type of sex education significantly impacts
teenage gonorrhea rates. The point estimates for each type of sex education are also fairly
small and negative, with effects ranging from a 2.5 to 5.8 percentage point decline in teenage
gonorrhea rates. Finally, Panel III, Column 2 (DDD) of Table 1.8 shows that no type of sex
education economically or significantly impacts teenage birth rates.
It is important to note that although the comprehensive sex education results are inconsistent
with the hypothesis that comprehensive sex education should increase contraception use, I
interpret the heterogeneous results on sexual behaviors, gonorrhea, and births with caution
for two main reasons. First, it is difficult to separate out effects by type of sex education, due
to many states continuously switching between mandate type, and repealing their law alto-
gether (see Figure 1.2). Second, for the main analysis, I define comprehensive sex education
states as those that require coverage of abstinence and coverage of contraception, plus those
that stress abstinence and cover contraception (i.e. “abstinence-plus”), since abstinence-plus
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programs do indeed teach students about contraception. However, it also seems plausible
to combine states with abstinence-plus mandates with states that require abstinence-only
sex education. The results of this recode of abstinence and comprehensive sex education are
presented in Table 1.13. The effect of comprehensive sex education on decreasing teenage
condom use is not robust to this reclassification. Additionally, the results now suggest that
comprehensive sex education marginally increases sexual activity by 5.7 percent, and the
teenage birth rate by 3 percentage points. Thus, the sensitivity of the estimates to type
of sex education classification fails to provide strong evidence that abstinence-based, com-
prehensive, or unspecified sex education differentially effect teenage sexual behaviors and
health.
1.7 Discussion and Conclusion
This study presents new evidence on the effect of state-mandated school-based sex education
on teenage sexual behaviors and health. Importantly, this is the first paper to simultane-
ously estimate the effect of three types of state-mandated sex education, abstinence-based,
comprehensive, and “unspecified”, which allows me to directly compared the effects of each
type of education on teenage sexual behaviors and health, unlike the previous related liter-
ature. I exploit within-state variation in sex education mandates to estimate the effect on
recent sexual intercourse, condom use, female birth control pill use, having multiple sexual
partners, teenage gonorrhea rates, and teenage birth rates. Difference-in-difference results
show that any sex education mandate does not significantly impact teenage sexual behav-
iors, and difference-in-difference-in-difference results show no effect on teenage gonorrhea or
birth rates. Exploring sex education policy heterogeneity, difference-in-difference estimates
suggest that comprehensive sex education significantly decreases teenage condom use, and
unspecified sex education decreases female birth control pill use, and increases engaging with
25
multiple sexual partners. This negative effect of sex education on teenage sexual behaviors
does not translate to unfavorable sexual health outcomes, as sex education has no signif-
icant impact on teenage gonorrhea or birth rates. However, the heterogeneous results are
interpreted with caution due to variation and classification issues.
It is important to note that the null findings found in this paper potentially mask effects of
school district-level sex education curriculum on teenage sexual behaviors and health. Al-
though the state mandates the type of sex education required by all schools, the curriculum
used within sex education courses is largely left up to the school districts and the teach-
ers within those districts (Donovan, 1998). For example, Ohio does not have state health
standards or a model curriculum for sex education, and instruction is left up to each school
district and its staff. In 2015, five Ohio school districts brought in outside organizations,
such as a trained representative from the Hamilton County Public Health office, to teach
some or all of the sex education curriculum, whereas other schools districts relied on health
or physical education teachers to instruct the course (Jamie Gregory, 2015)33. This varia-
tion in type of information given to students across school districts within a state could have
differential effects on teenage sexual behaviors and health. Thus, future work should aim to
exploit district-level variation in sex education curriculum to potentially uncover effects on
sexual behaviors and health that are masked in the state-level analysis presented here.
Nevertheless, null effect of state-level sex education mandates on teenage sexual behaviors
and health is surprising, especially from a policymakers’ standpoint, given the debate about
if, and what type of, school-based sex education should be taught. However, the null finding
on teenage birth rates found in this study remains in line, both quantitatively and qualita-
tively, with the recent literature examining the effect of mandated sex education on teenage
births (Carr & Packham, 2016; Kearney & Levine, 2015). Though the recent declines in
33To take another example, currently in Minnesota, the state law requires sex education to be taught, and
it must be comprehensive, but must help students refrain from sexual activity until marriage, technically
accurate, and updated. Also according to the law, it allows for each school district to interpret this law in
their own way (MINN. STAT. 121A.23, 2017).
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the US teen birth rate have been primarily attributed to improvements in teens’ contracep-
tion use, and advocates give credit to sex education programs for their role in the decline
(Boonstra, 2014), the previous literature and current study find no clear evidence that these
programs are effective at decreasing the teenage birth rate.
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1.8 Figures
Figure 1.1: State-level Sex Education Mandates, 1997-2013
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Figure 1.2: Heterogeneity in State-level Sex Education Mandates, 1997-2013
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Figure 1.3: Event Study Estimates of the Effect of Sex Education Mandates on Teenage
Sexual Behaviors and Health
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Notes: Estimates of Equation 2 described in the text. All estimates include individual controls (when
applicable), state-level controls, and state and year fixed effects. 95 percent confidence intervals are shown
extending from each point. All estimates are relative to years 0 and -1. The F-stat and p-value of a joint
test of significance on the policy leads are also shown.
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1.9 Tables
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics of Analysis Variables, 1997-2013
N Mean SD Min Max
Panel I: YRBS Data
Demographics
Grade 997,460 10.37 1.101 9 12
Age 1,007,350 15.97 1.238 12 18
Male 1,004,800 0.490 0.500 0 1
White 1,011,009 0.540 0.498 0 1
Black 1,011,009 0.148 0.355 0 1
Hispanic 1,011,009 0.162 0.369 0 1
Outcome measures
Sexual Activity 822,385 0.335 0.472 0 1
Condom Use 260,909 0.560 0.490 0 1
Birth Control Pill Use 137,569 0.217 0.412 0 1
Multiple Sexual Partners 275,142 0.270 0.444 0 1
Panel II: State-level Data
State-level controls
Parental involvement law 867 0.648 0.478 0 1
Mandatory wait law for abortion 867 0.359 0.480 0 1
Beer taxes 867 0.255 0.204 0.017 1.137
Blood alcohol content law 867 0.764 0.414 0 1
Per capita income (in 2000$) 867 31,317.9 6,588.2 20,256.3 74,513.0
Teenage unemployment rate 867 5.678 2.045 2.300 13.70
Percent White 867 0.773 0.151 0.166 0.975
Percent Black 867 0.138 0.134 0.004 0.637
State-level outcome measures
Teenage Gonorrhea Rate 867 4.133 3.879 0.064 36.08
Teenage Female Gonorrhea Rate 867 5.761 5.116 0.019 42.92
Teenage Male Gonorrhea Rate 867 2.580 2.692 0.043 28.67
Teenage Birth Rate 867 39.62 13.01 11.93 71.84
State-level treatment measures
Sex Education 867 0.449 0.498 0 1
Abstinence-Based 867 0.116 0.245 0 1
Comprehensive 867 0.205 0.404 0 1
Unspecified 867 0.128 0.334 0 1
Notes: Data on individual-level outcome measures and demographics come from the State and National YRBS from 1997-2013. Condom use,
birth control pill use, and multiple sexual partners are all conditional on having had sex. Birth control pill use is for the sample of female
respondents only. Multiple Sexual Partners is defined as having more than 1 sexual partner. The descriptive statistics for all YRBS Outcome
measures are for the estimation sample in Panel III in Table 3. Data on state-level economic and policy controls come from multiple sources:
abortion policies are obtained from Sabia & Anderson (2016), beer taxes - Beer Institute, blood alcohol content law - Anderson et al. (2015),
per capita income - US Census Bureau, teenage unemployment rate - Bureau of Labor Statistics, percent white and black - US Census Bureau.
Data on state-level STD rates for 15-19 year olds come from CDC WONDER Online Database for the years 1997-2013, and data on female birth
rates for 15 to 19 year olds come from the National Vital Statistics from 1997-2013. The gonorrhea and birth rates for 15 to 19 year olds are
per 1,000 individuals. Data on treatment measures come from the SIECUS Report from 1997-2000 and from the Guttmacher Institute State
Policies in Brief: State Sex and HIV Education, 2001-2013.
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Table 1.2: The Effect of Any Sex Education on Teenage Sexual Behaviors
Had Sex Condom
Use
Birth
Control
Pill Use
Multiple
Partners
Panel I: No controls
SexEd 0.0195* 0.0107 0.0079 0.0044
(0.0113) (0.0081) (0.0060) (0.0054)
N 833,091 264,905 138,680 279,551
State-level controls No No No No
Individual-level controls No No No No
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend No No No No
Panel II: All Controls
SexEd 0.0153 0.0074 0.0049 0.0066
(0.0128) (0.0082) (0.0088) (0.0053)
N 822,385 260,909 137,569 275,142
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend No No No No
Panel III: With state-specific linear time trends
SexEd 0.0091 -0.0047 -0.0064 0.0095
(0.0137) (0.0054) (0.0090) (0.0057)
N 822,385 260,909 137,569 275,142
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Outcome Means 0.335 0.560 0.217 0.270
Notes: Weighted linear probability model estimates are obtained using data from the 1997-2013 YRBS. The variable
“SexEd” is the one-year lag of the sex education indicator. Individual controls include age, grade, gender, and race.
State-level controls include the teenage unemployment rate, real income per capita, state-level beer taxes, blood alcohol
content laws, parental involvement laws for abortion, and mandatory wait laws for abortion services. Outcomes means
are for the sample in Panel III. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
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Table 1.3: The Lagged Effect of Any Sex Education on Teenage Sexual Behaviors
Had Sex Condom
Use
Birth
Control
Pill Use
Multiple
Partners
Panel I: All controls
1 to 2 years after 0.0244 -0.0079 0.0107 0.0098
(0.0229) (0.0142) (0.0158) (0.0081)
3 to 4 years after 0.0054 0.0051 -0.0101 0.0273**
(0.0177) (0.0149) (0.0121) (0.0130)
5 to 6 years after 0.0023 0.0117 0.0183 0.0244**
(0.0219) (0.0126) (0.0154) (0.0111)
7+ years after -0.0092 0.0022 0.0286* 0.0046
(0.0199) (0.0148) (0.0150) (0.0107)
N 822,385 260,909 137,569 275,142
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend No No No No
Panel II: With state-specific linear time trends
1 to 2 years after 0.023 -0.0175 -0.0055 0.007
(0.0209) (0.0126) (0.0130) (0.0090)
3 to 4 years after 0.0269 -0.0036 -0.0119 0.0278*
(0.0182) (0.0137) (0.0144) (0.0148)
5 to 6 years after 0.0317 0.0108 0.0325 0.0197
(0.0216) (0.0150) (0.0206) (0.0186)
7+ years after 0.0364 0.0123 0.0337 0.0001
(0.0257) (0.0192) (0.0284) (0.0214)
N 822,385 260,909 137,569 275,142
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Outcome Means 0.335 0.560 0.217 0.270
Notes: Weighted linear probability model estimates are obtained using data from the 1997-2013 YRBS. Sets of years
are grouped together for each lag coefficient to account for the biennial nature of the survey, and the variation in
sex education enactment year. Individual controls include age, grade, gender, and race. State-level controls include
the teenage unemployment rate, real income per capita, state-level beer taxes, blood alcohol content laws, parental
involvement laws for abortion, and mandatory wait laws for abortion services. Outcomes means are for the sample in
Panel III. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.4: The Effect of Any Sex Education on Logged Teenage Gonorrhea Rates
All - DD All -
DDD
Males -
DD
Males -
DDD
Females
- DD
Females
- DDD
Panel I: No controls
SexEd 0.0261 -0.0466 0.0289 -0.0565 0.0243 -0.0375
(0.0317) (0.0458) (0.0315) (0.0444) (0.0371) (0.0431)
N 867 1,734 865 1,732 867 1,734
State-level controls No No No No No No
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend No No No No No No
Panel II: All controls
SexEd 0.0103 -0.0528 0.0038 -0.0701* 0.0129 -0.0399
(0.0265) (0.0395) (0.0278) (0.0384) (0.0313) (0.0381)
N 867 1,734 865 1,732 867 1,734
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend No No No No No No
Panel III: With state-specific linear time trends
SexEd -0.0258 -0.0495 -0.0338 -0.0632 -0.0213 -0.0385
(0.0424) (0.0469) (0.0411) (0.0468) (0.0440) (0.0442)
N 867 1,734 865 1,732 867 1,734
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Outcome Means 4.133 4.430 2.580 3.407 5.761 5.510
Notes: Weighted estimates are obtained using data on STD rates for 15-19 year olds for columns 1, 3, and 5, and for 15-24 year olds
for columns 2, 4, and 6, from CDC WONDER Online Database for the years 1997-2013. The variable “SexEd” is the one-year lag of
the sex education indicator. State-level controls include the percentage of teens who are white, the percentage of teens who are black,
the teenage unemployment rate, real income per capita, state-level beer taxes, blood alcohol content laws, parental involvement laws
for abortion, and mandatory wait laws for abortion services. Outcome means are for the sample in Panel III. Standard errors clustered
at the state level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.5: The Effect of Any Sex Education on Logged Teenage Birth Rates
All - DD All - DDD Under 16
y.o. - DD
16 + y.o. -
DD
Panel I: No controls
SexEd 0.0244 0.0003 0.0327 0.0217
(0.0180) (0.0080) (0.0238) (0.0186)
N 867 1,734 859 867
State-level controls No No No No
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend No No No No
Panel II: All controls
SexEd 0.0114 -0.0018 0.013 0.013
(0.0146) (0.0077) (0.0204) (0.0144)
N 867 1,734 859 867
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend No No No No
Panel III: With state-specific linear time trends
SexEd 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0044 -0.0017
(0.0051) (0.0066) (0.0153) (0.0056)
N 867 1,734 859 867
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Outcome Means 40.01 70.83 8.568 47.71
Notes: Weighted estimates are obtained using data on birth rates for females 15-19 year olds for columns 1, 3, and
4, and 15-24 year olds for column 2, from the National Center for Health Statistics, Division of Vital Statistics
Natality Files for the years 1997-2013. The variable “SexEd” is the one-year lag of the sex education indicator.
State-level controls include the percentage of teens who are white, the percentage of teens who are black, the
teenage unemployment rate, real income per capita, state-level beer taxes, blood alcohol content laws, parental
involvement laws for abortion, and mandatory wait laws for abortion services. Outcome means are for the sample
in Panel III. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.6: The Effect of Sex Education Type on Teenage Sexual Behaviors
Had Sex Condom
Use
Birth
Control
Pill Use
Multiple
Partners
Panel I: No controls
Abstinence 0.0221 0.0107 0.0076 0.0004
(0.0134) (0.0105) (0.0077) (0.0071)
Comprehensive 0.0148* 0.0085 0.0102* 0.0136
(0.0084) (0.0093) (0.0054) (0.0111)
Unspecified 0.0159* 0.0168* 0.0026 0.0038
(0.0089) (0.0088) (0.0100) (0.0061)
N 833,091 264,905 138,680 279,551
State-level controls No No No No
Individual-level controls No No No No
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend No No No No
Panel II: All Controls
Abstinence 0.0161 0.0074 0.0040 0.0046
(0.0156) (0.0115) (0.0107) (0.0070)
Comprehensive 0.0158* 0.0059 0.0099 0.0129*
(0.0089) (0.0101) (0.0065) (0.0075)
Unspecified 0.0077 0.0120 -0.0049 -0.0001
(0.0079) (0.0076) (0.0172) (0.0071)
N 822,385 260,909 137,569 275,142
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend No No No No
Panel III: With state-specific linear time trends
Abstinence 0.0062 0.0008 -0.0105 0.0055
(0.0147) (0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0074)
Comprehensive 0.0183 -0.0182* 0.0116 0.0199
(0.0113) (0.0095) (0.0129) (0.0125)
Unspecified 0.0069 -0.0077 -0.0299* 0.0179**
(0.0132) (0.0084) (0.0154) (0.0085)
N 822,385 260,909 137,569 275,142
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Outcome Means 0.335 0.560 0.217 0.270
Notes: Weighted linear probability model estimates are obtained using data from the 1997-2013 YRBS. The variables
“Abstinence”, “Comprehensive”, and “Unspecified” are the one-year lags of the Abstinence, Comprehensive, and
Unspecified sex education indicators, respectively. Individual controls include age, grade, gender, and race. State-level
controls include the teenage unemployment rate, real income per capita, state-level beer taxes, blood alcohol content
laws, parental involvement laws for abortion, and mandatory wait laws for abortion services. Outcomes means are for
the sample in Panel III. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.7: The Effect of Sex Education Type on Logged Teenage Gonorrhea Rates
All - DD All -
DDD
Males -
DD
Males -
DDD
Females
- DD
Females
- DDD
Panel I: No controls
Abstinence -0.0157 -0.0522 -0.0252 -0.0604 -0.0110 -0.0483
(0.0288) (0.0522) (0.0342) (0.0487) (0.0351) (0.0494)
Comprehensive 0.1058* -0.0285 0.1235** -0.0461 0.0960 -0.0050
(0.0622) (0.0365) (0.0611) (0.0405) (0.0675) (0.0389)
Unspecified 0.1035 -0.0514 0.1519 -0.0584 0.0771 -0.0229
(0.1463) (0.0527) (0.1569) (0.0591) (0.1418) (0.0488)
N 867 1,734 865 1,732 867 1,734
State-level controls No No No No No No
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend No No No No No No
Panel II: All controls
Abstinence -0.0284 -0.0615 -0.0388 -0.0765* -0.0232 -0.0526
(0.0257) (0.0458) (0.0347) (0.0415) (0.0294) (0.0454)
Comp 0.0745 -0.0276 0.0755 -0.0519 0.0727 -0.0062
(0.0594) (0.0380) (0.0577) (0.0464) (0.0652) (0.0385)
Unspecified 0.0923 -0.0337 0.1178 -0.0540 0.0777 -0.0038
(0.1476) (0.0584) (0.1641) (0.0680) (0.1414) (0.0532)
N 867 1,734 865 1,732 867 1,734
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend No No No No No No
Panel III: With state-specific linear time trends
Abstinence -0.0640 -0.0584 -0.0690 -0.0710 -0.0604 -0.0510
(0.0500) (0.0541) (0.0505) (0.0514) (0.0506) (0.0522)
Comprehensive 0.0149 -0.0253 0.0031 -0.0436 0.0206 -0.0063
(0.0623) (0.0407) (0.0643) (0.0479) (0.0639) (0.0402)
Unspecified -0.0285 -0.0342 -0.0157 -0.0444 -0.0355 -0.0097
(0.0999) (0.0573) (0.1004) (0.0619) (0.1020) (0.0548)
N 867 1,734 865 1,732 867 1,734
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Outcome Means 4.133 4.430 2.580 3.407 5.761 5.510
Notes: Weighted estimates are obtained using data on STD rates for 15-19 year olds for columns 1, 3, and 5, and for 15-24 year olds for
columns 2, 4, and 6, from CDC WONDER Online Database for the years 1997-2013. The variables “Abstinence”, “Comprehensive”,
and “Unspecified” are the one-year lags of the Abstinence, Comprehensive, and Unspecified sex education indicators, respectively.
State-level controls include the percentage of teens who are white, the percentage of teens who are black, the teenage unemployment
rate, real income per capita, state-level beer taxes, blood alcohol content laws, parental involvement laws for abortion, and mandatory
wait laws for abortion services. Outcome means are for the sample in Panel III. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.8: The Effect of Sex Education Type on Logged Teenage Birth Rates
All - DD All - DDD Under 16
y.o. - DD
16 + y.o. -
DD
Panel I: No controls
Abstinence 0.0235 0.0217** 0.0265 0.0211
(0.0186) (0.0098) (0.0239) (0.0192)
Comprehensive 0.0293 0.0306** 0.0571** 0.0251
(0.0208) (0.0151) (0.0261) (0.0209)
Unspecified 0.017 0.0093 0.0207 0.017
(0.0342) (0.0264) (0.0535) (0.0346)
N 867 1,734 859 867
State-level controls No No No No
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend No No No No
Panel II: All controls
Abstinence 0.0073 0.0113 0.0044 0.0091
(0.0143) (0.0084) (0.0192) (0.0141)
Comprehensive 0.0204 0.0259* 0.0383 0.0213
(0.0194) (0.0131) (0.0287) (0.0190)
Unspecified 0.0253 0.0181 0.0306 0.0281
(0.0406) (0.0323) (0.0706) (0.0366)
N 867 1,734 859 867
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend No No No No
Panel III: With state-specific linear time trends
Abstinence 0.0016 0.0039 -0.0028 -0.0029
(0.0056) (0.0074) (0.0147) (0.0061)
Comprehensive -0.002 0.015 -0.0033 -0.0029
(0.0068) (0.0113) (0.0252) (0.0073)
Unspecified 0.0095 0.0073 -0.03 0.0124
(0.0128) (0.0278) (0.0240) (0.0134)
N 867 1,734 859 867
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Outcome Means 40.01 70.83 8.568 47.71
Notes: Weighted estimates are obtained using data on birth rates for females 15-19 year olds for columns 1, 3, and
4, and 15-24 year olds for column 2, from the National Center for Health Statistics, Division of Vital Statistics
Natality Files for the years 1997-2013. The variables “Abstinence”, “Comprehensive”, and “Unspecified” are the
one-year lags of the Abstinence, Comprehensive, and Unspecified sex education indicators, respectively. State-
level controls include the percentage of teens who are white, the percentage of teens who are black, the teenage
unemployment rate, real income per capita, state-level beer taxes, blood alcohol content laws, parental involvement
laws for abortion, and mandatory wait laws for abortion services. Outcome means are for the sample in Panel III.
Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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1.10 Appendix Figures
Figure 1.4: Event Study Figures of the Effect of Repealed Sex Education Mandates on
Teenage Sexual Behaviors and Health
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Notes: Estimates of Equation 2 described in the text. All estimates include individual controls (when
applicable), state-level controls, and state and year fixed effects. 95 percent confidence intervals are shown
extending from each point. The F-stat and p-value of a joint test of significance on the policy leads are also
shown.
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1.11 Appendix Tables
Table 1.9: The Effect of Any Sex Education on Teenage Health Behaviors
Watch TV Bulemic Wear Bicycle Helmet
SexEd -0.0069 0.0014 -0.1090
(0.0104) (0.0026) (0.0750)
N 992,361 823,117 992,361
Outcome Means 0.768 0.055 0.269
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Weighted linear probability model estimates are obtained using data from the 1997-2013 YRBS. Individual
controls include age, grade, gender, and race. State-level controls include the unemployment rate, real income per
capita, state-level beer taxes, blood alcohol content laws, parental involvement laws for abortion, and mandatory wait
laws for abortion services. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
Table 1.10: The Effect of Any Sex Education on Teenage Sexual Behaviors - Omitting
NYRBS
Had Sex Condom Use Birth Control
Pill Use
Multiple
Partners
SexEd 0.0091 -0.0048 -0.0063 0.0096
(0.0138) (0.0054) (0.0090) (0.0058)
N 699,655 215,469 114,835 228,787
Outcome Means 0.327 0.598 0.226 0.266
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Weighted linear probability model estimates are obtained using data from the 1997-2013 State YRBS. Individual
controls include age, grade, gender, and race. State-level controls include the unemployment rate, real income per
capita, state-level beer taxes, blood alcohol content laws, parental involvement laws for abortion, and mandatory wait
laws for abortion services. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table 1.11: The Effect of Any Sex Education on Teenage Sexual Behaviors - Probit Estimates
Had Sex Condom Use Birth Control
Pill Use
Multiple
Partners
SexEd 0.0098 -0.0046 -0.0073 0.0092
(0.0142) (0.0054) (0.0090) (0.0059)
N 822,385 260,909 137,569 275,142
Outcome Means 0.335 0.560 0.217 0.270
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Weighted probit estimates are obtained using data from the 1997-2013 YRBS. Marginal effects are reported.
Individual controls include age, grade, gender, and race. State-level controls include the unemployment rate, real
income per capita, state-level beer taxes, blood alcohol content laws, parental involvement laws for abortion, and
mandatory wait laws for abortion services. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.12: The Effect of Any Sex Education on Teenage Sexual Behaviors By Age
Had Sex Condom Use Birth Control
Pill Use
Multiple
Partners
Panel I: Under 16 years old
SexEd 0.0215 0.0005 -0.0204 0.0147
(0.0145) (0.0129) (0.0139) (0.0157)
N 308,956 58,994 31,814 62,600
Outcome Means 0.201 0.656 0.114 0.298
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel II: 16 years old and over
SexEd 0.0013 -0.0041 -0.0025 0.0088*
(0.0142) (0.0060) (0.0112) (0.0051)
N 513,429 201,915 105,755 212,542
Outcome Means 0.410 0.575 0.213 0.259
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Weighted linear probability model estimates are obtained using data from the 1997-2013 YRBS. The variable
“SexEd” is the one-year lag of the sex education indicator. Individual controls include age, grade, gender, and race.
State-level controls include the teenage unemployment rate, real income per capita, state-level beer taxes, blood alcohol
content laws, parental involvement laws for abortion, and mandatory wait laws for abortion services. Outcomes means
are for the sample in Panel III. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
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Table 1.13: DD & DDD Estimates of Sex Education Type on Teenage Sexual Behaviors and
Health
Had Sex Condom
Use
Birth
Control
Pill Use
Multiple
Partners
Gonorrhea Birth
rate
Panel I: No controls
Abstinence (w/ Abst-Plus) 0.0178 0.0088 0.0129* 0.0034 -0.0475 0.0213***
(0.0126) (0.0090) (0.0069) (0.0068) (0.0470) (0.0079)
Comprehensive 0.0254** 0.0122** -0.0043 0.0086 -0.0238 0.0639**
(0.0108) (0.0057) (0.0102) (0.0165) (0.0423) (0.0202)
Unspecified 0.0173* 0.0171** 0.0017 0.0017 -0.0528 0.0219
(0.0099) (0.0082) (0.0097) (0.0067) (0.0559) (0.0222)
N 833,091 264,905 138,680 279,551 1,734 1,734
State-level controls No No No No No No
Individual-level controls No No No No No No
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend No No No No No No
Panel II: All controls
Abstinence (w/ Abst-Plus) 0.0141 0.0060 0.0093 0.0082 -0.0550 0.0131*
(0.0146) (0.0096) (0.0100) (0.0068) (0.0410) (0.0074)
Comprehensive 0.0219* 0.0084 -0.0034 0.0050 -0.0246 0.0471**
(0.0111) (0.0081) (0.0113) (0.0133) (0.0426) (0.0215)
Unspecified 0.0080 0.0122* -0.0062 -0.0014 -0.0385 0.0227
(0.0089) (0.0071) (0.0170) (0.0070) (0.0568) (0.0287)
N 822,385 260,909 137,569 275,142 1,734 1,734
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend No No No No No No
Panel III: With state-specific linear time trends
Abstinence (w/ Abst-Plus) 0.0071 -0.0022 -0.0076 0.0087 -0.0521 0.0040
(0.0147) (0.0067) (0.0091) (0.0075) (0.0482) (0.0075)
Comprehensive 0.0192* -0.0143 0.0085 0.0120 -0.0202 0.0324*
(0.0114) (0.0133) (0.0126) (0.0176) (0.0466) (0.0190)
Unspecified 0.0017 -0.0012 -0.0382*** 0.0135* -0.0366 0.0091
(0.0137) (0.0116) (0.0139) (0.0076) (0.0580) (0.0247)
N 822,385 260,909 137,569 275,142 1,734 1,734
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Outcome Means 0.335 0.560 0.217 0.270 4.430 70.83
Notes: DD weighted linear probability model estimates are obtained using data from the 1997-2013 YRBS for columns 1-4. DDD
weighted estimates are obtained using data on STD rates for 15-24 year olds for column 5 from CDC WONDER Online Database for
the years 1997-2013. DDD weighted estimates are obtained using data on birth rates for females 15-24 year olds for column 6 from the
National Center for Health Statistics, Division of Vital Statistics Natality Files for the years 1997-2013. The variables “Abstinence”,
“Comprehensive”, and “Unspecified” are the one-year lags of the Abstinence, Comprehensive, and Unspecified sex education indicators,
respectively. Abstinence sex education includes Abstinence-plus sex education. Individual controls include age, grade, gender, and race.
State-level controls include the percentage of teens who are white, the percentage of teens who are black, the teenage unemployment
rate, real income per capita, state-level beer taxes, blood alcohol content laws, parental involvement laws for abortion, and mandatory
wait laws for abortion services. Outcome means are for the sample in Panel III. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.14: The Effect of Sex Education on Teenage Sexual Behaviors, Timing Heterogeneity
Had Sex Condom
Use
Birth
Control
Pill Use
Multiple
Partners
Gonorrhea Birth
rate
Panel I: No controls
SexEd-On 0.0181 -0.0001 0.0084 0.002 0.0472 0.0421
(0.0162) (0.0092) (0.0070) (0.0079) (0.0431) (0.0369)
SexEd-Off -0.0087 -0.0119* 0.0019 -0.0038 -0.0302 -0.0165
(0.0080) (0.0069) (0.0104) (0.0068) (0.0751) (0.0265)
F-test of On=Off (p-value) 5.09
(0.0286)
1.14
(0.2907)
0.47
(0.4941)
0.69
(0.4096)
1.76
(0.1905)
6.53
(0.0137)
N 833,091 264,905 138,680 279,551 867 867
State-level controls No No No No No No
Individual-level controls No No No No No No
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend No No No No No No
Panel II: All Controls
SexEd-On 0.0144 -0.0063 0.0062 0.0087 0.0237 0.0428
(0.0197) (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0074) (0.0459) (0.0266)
SexEd-Off -0.0084 -0.0151** 0.0017 0.0071 -0.0333 0.0163
(0.0081) (0.0061) (0.0113) (0.0080) (0.0753) (0.0202)
F-test of On=Off (p-value) 3.01
(0.089)
0.79
(0.3788)
0.14
(0.7138)
0.05
(0.8284)
1.21
(0.2758)
2.07
(0.1565)
N 822,385 260,909 137,569 275,142 867 867
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend No No No No No No
Panel III: With state-specific linear time trends
SexEd-On 0.0118 -0.0056 -0.0044 0.0085 -0.0849* 0.0059
(0.0178) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0071) (0.0467) (0.0079)
SexEd-Off 0.0104 -0.0065 0.0014 0.0015 -0.1319 0.0075
(0.0166) (0.0146) (0.0182) (0.0089) (0.0962) (0.0096)
F-test of On=Off (p-value) 0.01
(0.9303)
0.01
(0.9166)
0.15
(0.7025)
0.59
(0.4463)
0.37
(0.5449)
0.03
(0.8705)
N 822,385 260,909 137,569 275,142 867 867
State-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-specific time trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Outcome Means 0.335 0.560 0.217 0.270 4.133 70.83
Notes: DD weighted linear probability model estimates are obtained using data from the 1997-2013 YRBS for columns 1-4. DD weighted
estimates are obtained using data on STD rates for 15-19 year olds for column 5 from CDC WONDER Online Database for the years
1997-2013. DD weighted estimates are obtained using data on birth rates for females 15-19 year olds for column 6 from the National
Center for Health Statistics, Division of Vital Statistics Natality Files for the years 1997-2013. The variable “SexEd-On” is the one-year
lag of an indicator equal to 1 when a sex education mandate is enacted, and 0 otherwise. The variable “SexEd-Off” is the one-year lag of
an indicator equal to 1 when a sex education mandate is repealed, and 0 otherwise. Individual controls include age, grade, gender, and
race. State-level controls include the teenage unemployment rate, real income per capita, state-level beer taxes, blood alcohol content
laws, parental involvement laws for abortion, and mandatory wait laws for abortion services. Outcomes means are for the sample in
Panel III. Standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 2
Does an Introduction of a Paid
Parental Leave Policy Affect Maternal
Labor Market Outcomes in the
Short-Run? Evidence from Australia’s
Paid Parental Leave Scheme
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2.1 Introduction
As of 2010, the United States and Australia were the only two OECD countries that did
not have a comprehensive paid family leave program (International Labour Organization,
2014). Family leave programs are typically designed to provide new mothers time off of work
to prepare for, or recover from, childbirth, and provide parents with time to care for their
newborn or newly adopted children (Rossin-Slater, 2017). These policies aim to increase
maternal employment, promote child health and development, and improve the work-family
balance (Kunze, 2016). Family leave policies differ substantially across the globe, with some
countries providing short, unpaid leave as in the United States, or more generous, paid
family leave as in most European countries and Canada. Paid family leave is an important
policy tool that can have considerable impacts on child outcomes, and maternal labor market
outcomes.
Prior literature studying the effects of family leave on child outcomes and mothers’ labor
market outcomes is mixed, possibly due to the substantial heterogeneity in parental leave
policies across the globe. Previous studies analyzing the effect of an introduction of paid
family leave find positive labor market effects for the children affected by such a policy, and
generally positive effects on maternal labor market outcomes. Carneiro et al. (2015) study
the implementation of a four-month paid maternity leave policy in Norway in 1977, where
the previous policy only granted three months of unpaid leave. The authors find that the
introduction of the policy led to a two percentage point decline in high school dropout rates
and a five percent increase in earnings at age 30 for the children affected by the policy. The
authors also attempt to disentangle the potential mechanisms leading to these results by
examining the effect of the reform on maternal labor market outcomes, and they find no
long-term effects of the reform on mothers’ employment 2 and 5 years after implementation
or on their earnings 5 years after (Carneiro et al., 2015). Additionally, Rossin-Slater et
al. (2013) examine the effect of the introduction of California’s paid family leave program
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on leave-taking by mothers after childbirth and subsequent labor market outcomes using a
difference-in-difference approach. The authors find that the overall use of maternity leave
increased, and the paid family leave increased the number of usual weekly work hours. On
the other hand, previous studies examining the extension of a previous family leave policy
tend to find more mixed evidence on maternal labor market outcomes and child outcomes
(Baker & Milligan, 2008; Kluve & Tamm, 2013; Liu et al., 2009; Rasmussen, 2010; Scho¨nberg
& Ludsteck, 2014).1
Given the substantial positive impacts paid family leave may have on child and maternal
outcomes, more research on the causal effect of paid family leave on these outcomes is needed.
This paper aims to shed additional light on the impact of introducing a paid family leave
policy on maternal labor market outcomes by analyzing the effect of an introduction of a
paid parental leave scheme in Australia.
In early 2010, the Australian government began ironing out the details for their forthcoming
Paid Parental Leave (PPL) scheme for new parents who are the primary caregivers of a child
born or adopted on or after January 1, 2011. An eligible primary caregiver would receive
taxable PPL payments of the National minimum wage each week (currently $719.20), for
a maximum of 18 weeks. This policy change creates variation in the receipt of paid family
leave that allows me to assess how introducing a parental leave payment scheme after a child
is born affects the mother’s labor supply decisions. The PPL scheme is work contingent,
and requires women to be in paid work and have worked continuously prior to the birth or
adoption of a new child. The scheme aims to increase the average length of leave taken by
employed women after childbirth by around ten weeks, and encourage increased workforce
participation for women prior to having children and between pregnancies (Government,
2009).
1See Rossin-Slater (2017) for a review on recent empirical research related to introductions and expansions
of global family leave policies.
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The introduction of Australia’s PPL scheme is similar to the Norwegian policy, but differs
in the time of implementation, financing, length of leave, and benefit payments. This paper
differs from the Carneiro et al. (2015) analysis and contributes to the existing paid family
leave literature in several important ways. First, I develop theoretical predictions of the effect
of an introduction of a paid leave scheme on mothers’ labor supply decisions pre and post-
birth. I then estimate the effect of the mother’s pre and post-birth labor market outcomes
using a regression discontinuity design, since PPL eligibility was based on the child’s date
of birth. Importantly, I test the hypothesis that the introduction of PPL impacts the labor
supply decisions of mothers pre-birth – an effect that has not yet been estimated in the family
leave literature. Next, I estimate the effect of the mother’s post-birth labor market outcomes
in the short-run, roughly 11 months after the policy passed. Finally, I am able to shed more
light on the potential mechanisms leading to the significant effects on child outcomes Carneiro
et al. (2015) found by estimating the effect of PPL not only on employment status, but also
on hours worked, and the length of leave taken for the birth of the child.
The theoretical results imply that after the introduction of PPL, hours of work in the pre-
birth period should decrease for mothers who will qualify for PPL, and increase for mothers
who are attempting to qualify for PPL. Post-birth, the theoretical results imply that more
mothers are out of work and on leave than would have been in the absence of PPL. The
empirical results suggest that the PPL had no significant effect on the average number of
hours or weeks worked pre-birth, the average age of the child when the mother returned to
work, or the average number of hours worked post-birth. The empirical results appear at
odds with the theoretical results, and this conflict could be due to three reasons.
First, the data used in this paper to estimate the impact of the PPL on maternal labor
market outcomes is group-level data, provided as cell means for the respective variable (e.g.
hours worked), instead of individual counts. Differential effects of the PPL scheme across
subgroups of mothers, such as the age of the mother, race, etc. may be masked in the
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aggregate data. Second, using a regression discontinuity design to estimate the effect of PPL
on pre-birth outcomes may not necessarily be the ideal empirical strategy. That is, mothers
who are not certain if they will give birth before or after the January 1, 2011 cut point may
not alter their behavior. A difference-in-difference design would likely yield more credible
estimates, but pretreatment data on the pre-birth outcomes under study is not available.
Third, regarding the lack of an effect on leave taking post-birth, mothers could be deciding
pre-birth how much leave they will take, regardless of the leave being financed through the
previous family assistance scheme or PPL scheme, and they will take as much leave as they
would have in the absence of PPL.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I provide background
information on Australia’s family assistance policy prior to the introduction of PPL, and
more detail on the current PPL policy. In Section 3, I discuss the theoretical framework. In
Section 4, I describe the empirical strategy and data used in the analysis. In Section 5, I
present the empirical results. Finally, in Section 6, I present a discussion of the main findings
and my conclusions.
2.2 Institutional Setting
2.2.1 Prior to Paid Parental Leave Introduction
Prior to the paid parental leave scheme implemented on January 1, 2011, employed women in
Australia were entitled to 12 months of unpaid, job-protected maternity leave. All employees
in Australia were eligible for the unpaid parental leave if they had completed at least 12
months of continuous service with their employer up until the time of birth. Some employers
may have granted additional paid/unpaid maternity leave to their employees. Additionally,
women who gave birth to a child from July 1, 2004 until December 31, 2013 and had a family
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adjusted taxable income of $75,000 or less in the 6 months after childbirth automatically
received a non-taxable cash payment ranging between $3000 - $5,000 (i.e. the Baby Bonus)2.
Furthermore, families may have also been eligible to receive the Family Tax Benefit (FTB).
FTB Part A is a per child payment dependent upon the family’s circumstances. Eligible
families included those who cared for a dependent child age 0-19 years old, and who met
income and residence requirements, and cared for the dependent child at least 35% of the
time. The maximum rate per fortnight of the FTB Part A for each child aged 0-12 years of
age was $182.84.3 Single parents and families with one main income were also eligible for
FTB Part B as a supplement to FTB Part A. FTB Part B is an income tested fortnightly
payment that depends on the age of the youngest child. The maximum rate per fortnight
for a child aged 0 to 5 was $155.54, and $108.64 for children aged 5 to 18.
2.2.2 Introduction of Paid Parental Leave
To be eligible for PPL, and receive taxable PPL payments of $672.70 a week (the Federal
minimum wage level in Australia), for a maximum of 18 weeks, an individual must meet a
number of requirements: they must be the primary caregiver of a child born or adopted on
or after January 1, 2011, be in paid work and have been engaged in work continuously for at
least 10 out of the last 13 months prior to the birth or adoption of the child, worked at least
330 hours in the 10 month period, not have worked between the date of birth or adoption
of the child and their requested start date for PPL, and have an adjusted taxable income of
$150,000 or less in the financial year prior to the date of birth or adoption of the child or
the date of their claim, whichever is earlier.
PPL must be taken after the birth of the child and within 12 months of the birth or adoption
2When the Baby Bonus was introduced in 2004, it was worth $3,000. The Baby Bonus increased to $5,000
in July 2008.
3For each child aged 13 to 19 in full time secondary study, the FTB Part A fortnight maximum was $237.86,
and for children aged 0-19 in an approved care organization was $58.66.
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of the child. Parents who meet the eligibility requirements for PPL can choose to receive the
Baby Bonus and other family assistance under the usual criteria instead of receiving PPL.4
Parents are not eligible to change their claim to the Baby Bonus after PPL payments have
begun. If eligible, families can still receive FTB Part A during receipt of PPL, but not FTB
Part B. If the primary caregiver’s employer provides employer-funded parental leave through
an industrial agreement, they cannot withdraw the entitlement for the life of the agreement.
Thus, the primary caregiver can receive PPL before, during, or after the employer-provided
paid leave.
The Australian government estimated that more than eighty-five percent of families will be
better off receiving PPL, and, on average, will receive roughly $2,000 more than if they
chose the benefits under the previous scheme. Acknowledging that family circumstances
tend to differ, the Government provides an online estimator simulating benefit amounts
under the Baby Bonus, and under PPL to help families make the best family assistance
decision (Government, 2009).
To provide an example of how entitlements changed after the introduction of PPL, Figure
2.1 calculates benefits provided to a working couple under the previous benefit system, and
under the new system with PPL. This example is drawn from the Australian Government’s
“Paid Parental Leave - Information for Parents” booklet, and uses 2008-2009 rates. Let us
assume a working couple, Jane and John, will birth their first child on August 5, 2011. Prior
to the birth of their child, Jane and John each earned $52,000 a year. Jane is not eligible for
paid maternity leave from her employer, but is entitled to 12 months of unpaid, job-protected
leave. She is also eligible for PPL, and will receive taxable payments of $543.78 per week
(the 2008-2009 minimum wage) for a maximum of 18 weeks, or a total of $9,788. Jane will
care full-time for her child, and not return to work until July 1, 2012. In the financial year of
their child’s birth, Jane and John will receive $2,335 more in net family assistance and PPL
4In the case of multiple births (twins, triplets, etc), the parent can claim PPL for one child and the Baby
Bonus for the other child/children.
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than they would have without PPL. Table 1 provides these calculations. Under the previous
system without PPL, Jane and John will receive the Baby Bonus, FTB Part A, and FTB
Part B, totaling $10,015. Under the new system with PPL, Jane and John will receive PPL,
FTB Part A, and partial FTB Part B (which will resume after 18 weeks of PPL have been
exhausted), totaling $12,350.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
Once the PPL scheme was introduced, eligible mothers could receive 18 weeks of paid leave
at the Australian minimum wage in addition to the 12 months of unpaid, job protected leave.
The introduction of PPL could impact the labor market decisions of mothers who are eligible
and choose to take the PPL at two different stages: pre-birth and post-birth. Figures 2.2
and 2.3 summarize the predicted effects of the PPL scheme on labor market decisions pre-
and post-birth. To begin, Figure 2.2 shows the labor supply figure in income-leisure space
(where hours of work are decreasing on the horizontal axis) for employed mothers’ labor
supply decision pre-birth, where E is the initial endowment (e.g. husband’s income), L is
hours of leisure, where leisure can be interpreted as time spent with the new child, and Y
is consumption.5,6 In Figure 2.2, the basic static labor supply graph is illustrated by line
segment “ab” and indifference curve A. Under both family assistance regimes (i.e. with and
without PPL), there is no effect on the labor supply decision of the mother in the pre-birth
period. However, we can also consider the mother’s intertemporal choice of labor supply in
the pre-birth period.
Recall that women are required to be employed for 10 of the last 13 months prior to the
5As in the standard static labor supply model, the mother’s budget constraint can be written as: Y =
w(T −L) +E. This specification of the budget constraint assumes that the mother does not save, and the
mother spends all of her income in the period under analysis.
6Also note that the FTB Part A is available to eligible families regardless of Baby Bonus of PPL receipt,
and this increase in non-labor income is omitted from the figures since it is available under both regimes.
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birth or adoption of the child, and have worked at least 330 hours in the 10 month period.
Figure 2.2 also shows the intertemporal decision of the mother in the pre-birth period. The
budget constraint will now kink once the mother works 330 hours. Once the mother works
330 hours in the 10 month period and qualifies for PPL, the budget constraint shifts up
(represented by line segment “cd”), since she will now receive the PPL, and the mother
moves from indifference curve A to indifference curve B. At indifference curve A, the mother
was previously working L’ hours (e.g. 350 hours) and already had qualified for the PPL.
At indifference curve B, the mother is now working only L* (e.g. 330 hours) hours, but
still qualifies for the PPL. Thus, hours of work in the pre-birth period should decrease for
mothers who will qualify for the PPL. Alternatively, mothers working only 320 hours before
the introduction of the PPL could increase their pre-birth work hours in order to qualify for
the PPL (not pictured). Once their pre-birth work hours hit 330, their budget constraint
will kink, and they will move to indifference curve B.
Figure 2.3 shows the labor supply decision of employed mothers post-birth. Post-birth,
mothers can decide to take leave and return to work at some date in the future, or quit their
job. If mothers value their job protection and prefer to return to work at their pre-birth
employer, then they should return to work within the permitted length of leave, which is
likely 12 months (given the 12 months of unpaid, job-protected leave). However, mothers
also have the option to quit their job, and re-enter the labor market at a lower reservation
wage. In the discussion that follows, I assume mothers choose to take leave and return
to their pre-birth employer at some date in the future.7 In Figure 2.3, I first illustrate
the predicted labor supply effect before the introduction of the PPL, and upon receipt of
the Baby Bonus. Mothers’ non-labor income increases from receipt of the Baby Bonus,
and her budget constraint shifts up by the amount BB (represented by line segment “ab”).
Mothers’ leisure hours and consumption increase, and her utility maximizing choice of leisure
and consumption will occur at (LBB, Y BB), implying that Baby Bonus receipt increases the
7See Klerman & Leibowitz (1995) for a detailed discussion of post-birth dynamic labor supply effects.
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amount of time mothers spend out of work and on leave with the child.
Next, in Figure 2.3, I also illustrate the predicted labor supply effect after the introduction
of PPL. Non-labor income increases from receipt of PPL, and the budget constraint shifts
up by the amount PPL (represented by line segment “cd”). It is important to note that
the increase in non-labor income from PPL is larger than the increase in non-labor income
from the Baby Bonus. This is the case because PPL provides 18 weeks of paid leave at the
National minimum wage each week for 18 weeks, whereas the Baby Bonus provides a one-
time payment of $5,000. Mothers who receive PPL increase their leisure hours more than
mothers who receive the BB, since the marginal rate of substitution between work hours and
leisure hours is higher. Thus, mothers who receive PPL spend more time out of work and
on leave post-birth than mothers who receive the Baby Bonus, and their utility maximizing
choice of leisure and consumption occurs at point (LPPL, Y PPL).
2.4 Empirical Strategy and Data
2.4.1 Empirical Strategy
My empirical strategy exploits the January 1, 2011 date-of-birth eligibility cutoff to identify
the effect of PPL using a regression discontinuity design (RDD). In order for the effect to be
identified via an RDD, it is assumed that mothers who give birth right before January 1, 2011
and mothers who give birth right after January 1, 2011 have similar characteristics in every
dimension except for PPL receipt (D. S. Lee & Lemieux, 2010). The crucial identification
issue is to what extent mothers could have influenced the date of birth of the current child in
anticipation of the policy change. There are two reasons that would suggest mothers could
not have influenced their child’s birth date. First, the conception of a child is an event that
cannot be perfectly timed by parents. Second, if parents could perfectly plan a conception
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and birth, this would require them to have been informed of the January 1, 2011 change at the
time of conception. According to the Australian Government’s Introduction to the PPL, full
information for parents, employers and the community about how the scheme will operate,
including guidelines for the program, was not available until October 2010 (Government,
2009). Therefore, births occurring around January 1, 2011 could not have been influenced
by anticipation of the PPL scheme. However, it is possible that mothers could have influenced
the timing of a birth by postponing induced births or planned caesarean sections.8
Figure 2.4 displays the daily number of births in Australia from November 1, 2010 to Febru-
ary 28, 2011 (2 months on each side of the cutoff), with linear fits on each side of the
threshold.9 Although visually there appears to be a slight discontinuity in births at the
threshold, the estimated jump is not statistically significant.10 Table 2.1 reports the esti-
mates corresponding to Figure 2.4 in column 1, and estimates from varying bandwidths and
polynomial choices. All estimates are statistically insignificant.
The other key identification assumption underlying the regression discontinuity procedure is
that the conditional expectations of the outcomes (e.g. hours worked) with respect to the
month of birth are smooth through the January 1, 2011 cut point. Although I cannot test
this assumption directly, an implication is that there should be no discontinuities in pre-
determined variables. I test for discontinuities in predetermined characteristics of mothers,
and examine if any discontinuities in the percentage of mothers who are Australian born,
the average age of the mother, the average age of the mother’s partner, and the percentage
of mothers with only one child exist. Figure 2.5 panels (a) - (d) plot the distribution of these
predetermined characteristics and the corresponding local linear regression estimates. There
is no evidence of any discontinuities in the predetermined characteristics.
8Gans & Leigh (2009) find evidence that mothers delayed their births in response to the Baby Bonus – an
Australian reform that changed fertility incentives.
9Daily birth count data was provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics Customized Data and Informa-
tion team.
10The gap in birth counts on each side of threshold is driven by more births occurring during the weekdays
rather than on the weekends.
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Therefore, in the absence of birth manipulation and discontinuities in predetermined char-
acteristics, I am able to identify the effect of PPL by comparing outcomes of mothers giving
birth during or after January 2011 to outcomes of mothers giving birth before January 2011.
If the policy had an effect on maternal labor market outcomes, we would expect to see a
sharp jump or fall in the outcome under study after the PPL cutoff date.
To analyze whether there is a discrete jump or fall in the studied outcomes, the following
reduced-form equation is estimated:
Ym = α + β1M + β2Post+ β3(M ∗ Post) + δ′Xm + m (2.1)
where Ym is the considered outcome in one-month age cell m, M is age in months re-centered
at 0 in January 2011, Post is a binary indicator equal to 1 in all months beginning January
2011, and Xm is a vector of one-month age cell covariates including the percentage of mothers
who are Australian born, average age of the mother, average age of the mother’s partner,
and percentage of mothers with only one child. The linear term M accounts for any smooth
fertility trends and is allowed to change on either side of the cutoff date.11 The coefficient
of interest, β2, would capture a discrete jump or fall in the outcome around January 2011,
and is identified by assuming no other factor affected the outcome discontinuously at the
cutoff.12
Since the units of observation in equation 1 are sample means within cells that are defined
by discrete values of age in months, the estimates and robust standard errors are obtained
from regressions that are weighted by the number of mothers contributing to each outcome
11I also experiment with a quadratic term M , and show that the results are generally robust across specifi-
cations.
12No other policy changes in early 2011 applied differentially to children born before and after the January
1 cutoff date, including the cutoff birth date that determines the year when a child starts school.
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cell.13
2.4.2 Data
My primary analysis will use data from the 2011 Australian Pregnancy and Employment
Transitions Survey (PETS). The PETS is a supplement to the Australian Bureau of Statistics
monthly Labor Force Survey. The survey was conducted in November 2011, and collected
information on women’s employment transitions during pregnancy, on starting or returning
to work after the birth of their child, and job details, for birth mothers of a child living with
them for which a child was under two years of age at the time of interview (Pink, 2011).
The PETS data are well suited for this study because, most importantly, they contain the
month and year of birth of all children, and they contain several measures of mothers’ labor
market outcomes, including employment status, income, number of hours worked, and the
age of the child when the mother returned to work.14
Although the PETS data is the preferred data source for this analysis, there are two main
limitations worthy of note. First, the data is available upon request as statistics in tabulated
form from the Australian Bureau of Statistics.15 That is, the data are group-level data,
provided as cell means for the respective variable (e.g. hours worked), instead of individual
counts. With individual-level data, I would be able to estimate the effect of PPL across
different subgroups of women if we believe the effect varies across age of the mother, race,
marital status, etc. Second, the PETS only includes mothers with children between the ages
13These estimates and standard errors are equivalent to estimates and standard errors that could be obtained
by estimating unweighted regressions using individual-level data, and clustering the standard errors by
month of birth (D. S. Lee & Lemieux, 2010).
14The HILDA (Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia) survey, a household-based panel study
that collects information about economic and personal well-being, labor market dynamics and family life,
is also an appropriate data source that could be used for this analysis. However, the HILDA contains a
very limited number of mothers who gave birth around the January 2011 threshold, and does not contain
information about employment during pregnancy.
15The PETS data is also available as a microdata product accessible from a secure data lab in Australia. At
this time, I do not have access to the microdata.
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of 0 and 2 years old as of November 2011. Since the data is provided by month and year
of birth of the child, this amounts to 24 month-year observations. Fewer month-year cells
make it more difficult to estimate a discontinuity at the threshold (D. S. Lee & Card, 2008).
Despite these limitations, I use the PETS data to analyze the effect of PPL on PPL take-up,
and three short-term maternal labor market outcomes: average number of hours worked per
week immediately before stopping work to give birth, average number of weeks the mother
stopped work before birth, and average number of hours actually worked per week in all jobs
as of November 2011. The PETS data also include information on the number of women
receiving the Baby Bonus and/or PPL. That is, in November 2011 when the survey was
administered, women were asked if they received the Baby Bonus or PPL (or both in the
case of multiple births) at the time of their child’s birth. This information allows me to
estimate the effect of PPL on Baby Bonus receipt - an indirect estimate of PPL take-up.
Regarding the labor market outcomes, both hours worked outcomes and number of weeks
stopped work are conditional on the mother being employed at the time of pregnancy. That
is, only mothers who reported being employed while pregnant answered the survey questions
about the number of hours worked before stopping work to give birth, the number of weeks
stopped work before birth, and the number of hours worked at the time of survey in November
2011.
Additionally, I estimate the effect of PPL on the average age of the child when the mother
returned to work. This question is asked of the PETS respondents in November 2011. That
is, mothers who reported being employed and had already returned to work as of November
2011 reported a positive age of the child when they returned to work. For mothers who
reported being employed but have not yet gone back to work, they reported an age of
the child when they returned to work of 0 years old. All mothers, whether or not they
have returned to work, are included in the estimation sample. Additionally, the sample
is restricted to mothers who reported being employed while they were pregnant, as these
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women are most likely to be eligible for PPL.
Table 2.2 Panel I presents descriptive statistics pre- and post-PPL for each of the outcomes
previously listed. Pre-PPL, the percentage of mothers receiving the Baby Bonus is 68.13,
and post-PPL, this percentage substantially falls to 19. The average number of weeks that
mothers stop work before giving birth is nearly 4 weeks both pre- and post-PPL. The average
number of hours worked before stopping work for childbirth is similar pre- and post-PPL,
with mothers working on average 30-31 hours. The age of the child when the mother returns
to work differs between pre- and post-PPL, due to some mothers post-PPL just giving birth
and remaining out of work and on leave (i.e. mothers who gave births in the few months
before November 2011). Pre-PPL, mothers return to work when their child is 30 weeks
old, and post-PPL, the average age of child is 12.5. Similarly, the average number of hours
worked in all jobs per week is much lower post-PPL (4.6 weeks) than pre-PPL (16 weeks),
again due to some mothers post-PPL just giving birth near the time of the survey.16
Table 2.2 Panel II presents descriptive statistics pre- and post-PPL for the included covari-
ates. All covariate means are similar across both time periods. The average number of
mothers who are Australian born is around 78-80 percent, the average age of the mother’s
partner is roughly 35 years, the average age of the mother is around 32 years, and the
percentage of mothers with only one child is about 49 percent.
16Hours worked per week in all jobs as of November 2011 is asked of all mothers who reported being employed
while pregnant, whether or not they started work since giving birth. Thus, the average number of hours
worked per week as of November 2011 includes zeros.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Paid Parental Leave Take-up
The effects of the PPL scheme on maternal labor market outcomes are summarized in Figures
2.6 through 2.10, and Tables 2.3 through 2.5. I begin by showing the effect of PPL on the
percentage of mothers receiving the Baby Bonus. Recall that women who gave birth to a
child from July 1, 2004 until December 31, 2013 and had a family adjusted taxable income
of $75,000 or less in the 6 months after childbirth automatically received the Baby Bonus.
Once the PPL scheme was introduced, mothers who gave birth on or after January 1, 2011
were able to receive either the PPL or the Baby Bonus, dependent upon eligibility for both.
Thus, only mothers who had family income below $75,000 six months after childbirth and
who had taxable income of $150,000 or less in the year before birth were eligible for both
the Baby Bonus and PPL (but still only able to receive one or the other). Due to data
limitations, I am unable to limit the Baby Bonus analysis to those that were eligible for
both the Baby Bonus and PPL. Therefore, I estimate the effect of PPL on the average Baby
Bonus receipt among the restricted sample (i.e. those women who reported being employed
while pregnant) in the PETS.
A mother could not claim both the Baby Bonus and PPL, except in the case of multiple
births. In order to determine the take-up of PPL, I look for a discontinuity in the percentage
of mothers receiving the Baby Bonus. Since families receiving PPL would, on average, re-
ceive around $2000 more than under current family assistance arrangements, it is expected
that receipt of the Baby Bonus should decrease once the PPL scheme was introduced (Gov-
ernment, 2009). Figure 2.6 panel (a) suggests that receipt of the Baby Bonus significantly
decreases after the implementation of the PPL scheme. Table 2.3 reports the results from
equation 1 on Baby Bonus receipt, where the dependent variable is the percentage of mothers
receiving the Baby Bonus. The results show that receipt of the Baby Bonus decreases by
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46 percent after the implementation of PPL.17 Figure 2.6 panel (b) displays the estimates
and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of PPL on Baby Bonus receipt using various
bandwidths. The results remain stable and significant across the different bandwidths.
2.5.2 Labor Market Outcomes
Next, I report results for the effect of the PPL on logged maternal labor market outcomes in
Table 2.4. Panel I includes a linear term in m, and Panel II includes a quadratic term in m.
I first begin with discussing the effect of PPL on maternal labor market outcomes pre-birth,
and then discuss the effect of PPL post-birth.
Given the work requirements for PPL eligibility, and the associated labor supply predictions
presented in Figure 2.2, we would expect PPL to either increase or decrease pre-birth labor
hours depending on the mothers’ current work hours. Table 2.4 column 1, Panels I and II,
suggest that the PPL scheme increases the average number of hours worked before stopping
work by roughly 4 percent, but the effect is not statistically significant. Figure 2.7 panel (a)
presents the corresponding regression discontinuity figure, and estimates by varying band-
widths are presented in Figure 2.7 panel (b). Across varying bandwidths, the estimates are
fairly stable, and appear to hover around zero as the bandwidth increases. This effect is
in line with the predictions, if mothers not meeting the work requirements to be eligible
for PPL are inclined to increase their work hours pre-birth. However, this positive effect,
although insignificant, is surprising. Recall that mothers are required to be employed for 10
of the last 13 months prior to the birth of the child, and have worked at least 330 hours
in the 10 month period. A mother could qualify for PPL by working 8.25 hours a week
in the 10 months prior to the birth of her child. Full-time, employed women in Australia
work an average of 39.8 hours per week, and part-time employed women work 18.8 hours
17Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.3 include quadratic and cubic terms in m, respectively. The estimated
coefficients slightly decline in magnitude, but remain highly statistically significant.
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per week, and women typically stop working 1 to 3 weeks before childbirth.18 Therefore, we
should expect women to decrease their work hours, since they most likely already qualify
for the PPL. The positive effect could be driven by more disadvantaged mothers attempting
to increase their work hours in order to qualify for the PPL. Due to data limitations, I am
unable to parse out the effect by socioeconomic subgroups.
Similarly, if PPL receipt could affect the number of hours worked pre-birth, we may expect
PPL to also affect the number of weeks the mother stopped work before the birth of her child.
If women are attempting to qualify for the PPL, they may decrease the number of weeks
they stop working before the birth of their child. Similarly, for women who are already going
to qualify for the PPL, they may increase the number of weeks they stop working before
the birth of their child. Table 2.4, column 2 suggests that indeed women are decreasing the
number of weeks they stop working before birth, but the estimated effects are statistically
insignificant. In Figure 2.8 panel (b), the estimated effects across varying bandwidths are
relatively stable, but still indistinguishable from zero. However, the precision of the estimate
is such that I can rule out, at the ninety-five percent confidence level, the number of weeks
stopped work before the birth increasing by more than 16 percent, and decreasing by more
than 50 percent. It is important to note, though, that the lack of a statistically significant
effect of the PPL on the average number of hours worked before stopping work for birth and
the average number of weeks stopped working before birth could be due to the empirical
methodology used to estimate the effect. Mothers who are not certain if they will give birth
before or after the January 1, 2011 cut point may not alter their behavior. Thus, using a
regression discontinuity design to estimate the effect of PPL pre-birth may not be the most
ideal empirical strategy. A difference-in-difference design would likely yield more precise
estimates, but pretreatment data on the outcomes under study is not available.
Once a mother gives birth, she can either choose to go back to work right away (within a
18These figures were obtained from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development:
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=ANHRS accessed December 2, 2017.
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reasonable amount of time post-birth), or remain at home and care for her child. After the
introduction of PPL, the predictions discussed above imply that more mothers should be out
of work and on leave than mothers who did not receive the PPL. Although I cannot directly
measure the average length of leave the mother took for the birth of her child, I can measure
the average age of the child when the mother returned to work. Table 2.4, column 3 suggests
that the introduction of PPL significantly increases the average age of the child when the
mother returned to work by 90.5 percent, or 27.5 weeks (30.41*0.905). However, it is clear
in Figure 2.9 panel (a) (and Table 2.4, panel II, column 3) that the positive effect of PPL
on this outcome is driven by the linearity imposed in the RDD model, and the downward
trend on the right side of the threshold - a result of mothers just giving birth near the time
of the survey still being out of work and at home with their child. If we look at a narrower
bandwidth, illustrated in Figure 2.9 panel (b), it does not appear that PPL significantly
increases the average age of the child when the mother returns to work. Taken together, it
seems that the PPL scheme does not significantly increase the average length of leave taken
by the mother post-birth. Since this effect was a primary goal of the policy, this finding is
of considerable importance.
Though there is no clear aggregate effect of PPL increasing mothers’ length of leave, this null
finding may mask heterogeneity in subgroup effects. Specifically, it may be that the average
length of leave varies by socio-economic status, with the most advantaged (disadvantaged)
mothers being able (not able) to afford to take the full 18 weeks of paid leave. To test this,
I collected PETS data on the average age of the child when the mother returned to work
by income quintile measured at the time of pregnancy.19 Table 2.5 reports the results for
the effect of PPL on the average age of the child when the mother returned to work by
income quintile. The positive effect persists across nearly all quintiles, but all estimates are
statistically insignificant. Although the estimates for all quintiles are imprecise, the evidence
19Average income per week by quintile is as follows: 1st quintile = $555.27; 2nd quintile = $1,140.94; 3rd
quintile = $1,580.48; 4th quintile = $2,083.20; 5th quintile = $3,684.51. Mothers in the fifth income
quintile have an average income that is nearly 7 times higher than mothers in the first quintile.
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is suggestive that all women are increasing their average length of leave as a result of PPL.
Although there does not appear to be an effect on the average age of the child when the
mother returns to work, we may still see an effect on the number of hours worked post-birth
as of November 2011. Women who receive the PPL may choose to go back to work at the
same time as mothers who did not receive the PPL, but the intensity of their work hours
may differ. The receipt of National minimum wage each week for 18 weeks for PPL mothers
may allow those mothers to return to work part-time during the 18 week period. If this
is the case, then as of November 2011 these mothers will have returned to work, but work
fewer hours per week than mothers who did not receive the PPL. Table 2.4, column 4, and
Figure 2.10 panel (a) present the effect of PPL on average number of hours worked per week
as of November 2011. In Figure 2.10 panel (a), the downward trend on the far right side of
the threshold is likely a result of mothers just giving birth near the time of the survey still
being out of work and at home with their child. Although there is a clear negative trend in
work hours within a narrow bandwidth of the threshold, the resulting RD estimate is small
and statistically insignificant. Across varying bandwidths (Figure 2.10 panel(b)), this result
appears to hover around zero, suggesting that mothers are not significantly decreasing their
work hours as a result of PPL receipt.
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
Using the introduction of a paid parental leave scheme in Australia on January 1 2011, this
paper presents theoretical predictions, and estimates the effect of an introduction of a family
leave policy on maternal labor market outcomes. The theoretical predictions imply that after
the introduction of PPL, hours of work in the pre-birth period should decrease for mothers
who will qualify for PPL, and increase for mothers who are attempting to qualify for PPL.
Post-birth, more mothers are out of work and on leave than would have been in the absence
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of PPL. By comparing the outcomes of mothers with babies born before January 1, 2011
to the outcomes of mothers with babies born on or after January 1, 2011 using a regression
discontinuity design, the empirical results show that the introduction of the PPL scheme
significantly decreases receipt of the Baby Bonus by 46 percent. Regarding maternal labor
market outcomes pre and post-birth, the results suggest that the PPL had no effect on hours
or weeks worked pre-birth, hours worked post-birth, or average length of leave taken by the
mother. From a policy perspective, the last result is striking since the Australian government
introduced the PPL scheme with the primary goal of increasing the average length of leave
taken by the mother for the birth of her child.
The lack of an effect on length of leave taken post-birth after the introduction of PPL appears
at odds with the theoretical predictions discussed above. In the conceptual framework, the
post-birth labor market prediction after the introduction of PPL implies a positive income
effect, where both consumption and leisure increase. However, the empirical results suggest
a zero income effect, where length of leave remains unchanged, and consumption increases.
This could be due to mothers deciding pre-birth how much leave they will take, regardless of
the leave being financed through the Baby Bonus or PPL. Recall the average age of the child
when the mother returns to work is 27.3 weeks. If mothers were already taking longer than
18 weeks of leave without pay, an introduction of paid leave of a shorter length of time would
not alter their behavior. They will take as much leave as they would have in the absence of
PPL, and simply be happy that some of it turns out to be paid.
The effect of an introduction of a paid family leave policy is of great importance and needs
to be understood, especially given the current conversations in the United States and other
countries around the world about introducing paid family leave. Although the PPL results
of this paper do not appear to affect labor market outcomes for mothers on average, it is
possible that the effects of PPL for some subgroups are masked. Future work would benefit
from individual-level data that could be used to estimate the effect of PPL across different
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subgroups of women, beyond income quintiles, if we believe the effect varies across age of the
mother, race, marital status, etc. Additionally, PPL may have significant positive effects on
the children affected by the policy. If mothers receiving PPL are not increasing their length
of leave, but are collecting PPL payments throughout some of the leave, this extra income
may be used to benefit the child. This paper does not have the data necessary to explore this
hypothesis, but it is worth exploring in future work related to paid parental leave policies.
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2.7 Figures
Figure 2.1: Family Assistance Example
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Figure 2.2: Predicted Effect of Maternal Labor Supply Pre-birth
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Figure 2.3: Predicted Effect of Maternal Labor Supply Post-birth
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Figure 2.4: Births Discontinuity
Notes: The log of the number of children born to mothers from November 1, 2010 to February 28,
2011, and separate linear fits on each side of the January 1, 2011 cutoff. The vertical line denotes
the PPL cutoff of January 1, 2011, normalized to 0.
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Figure 2.5: Balance in Predetermined Characteristics
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Notes: Balance in covariates around the January 1, 2011 threshold: (a) Percentage of mothers who
are Australian born; (b) Average age of the mother; (c) Average age of the mother’s partner; (d)
Percentage of mothers with only 1 child.
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Figure 2.6: Baby Bonus Receipt
(a)
(b)
Notes: The percentage of mothers receiving the Baby Bonus. In panel (a), each data point corre-
sponds to the average value of the percentage of mothers receiving the Baby Bonus by month of
birth of the child in 1-month bins. The window includes all children born to mothers from January
2010 until November 2011.The vertical line denotes the PPL cutoff of January 1, 2011, normalized
to 0. Panel (b) presents the equivalent coefficient estimates and associated 95% confidence intervals
when equation 1 is estimated using 3, 4,...,12 month-of-birth cohorts on either side of the threshold.
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Figure 2.7: Average Number of Hours Worked Before Stopping Work for Birth
(a)
(b)
Notes: Average number of hours worked by the mother immediately before stopping work for the
birth of her child. In panel (a), each data point corresponds to the average value of each outcome
by month of birth of the child in 1-month bins. The window includes all children born to mothers
from January 2010 until November 2011. The vertical line denotes the PPL cutoff of January 1,
2011, normalized to 0. Panel (b) presents the equivalent coefficient estimates and associated 95%
confidence intervals when equation 1 is estimated using 3, 4,...,12 month-of-birth cohorts on either
side of the threshold.
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Figure 2.8: Average Number of Weeks Stopped Working before Birth
(a)
(b)
Notes: Average number of weeks the mother stopped work before the birth of her child. In panel
(a), each data point corresponds to the average value of each outcome by month of birth of the
child in 1-month bins. The window includes all children born to mothers from January 2010
until November 2011. The vertical line denotes the PPL cutoff of January 1, 2011, normalized to
0. Panel (b) presents the equivalent coefficient estimates and associated 95% confidence intervals
when equation 1 is estimated using 3, 4,...,12 month-of-birth cohorts on either side of the threshold.
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Figure 2.9: Average Age of the Child When the Mother Returned to Work
(a)
(b)
Notes: Average age of the child when the mother returned to work. In panel (a), each data
point corresponds to the average value of each outcome by month of birth of the child in 1-month
bins. The window includes all children born to mothers from January 2010 until November 2011.
The vertical line denotes the PPL cutoff of January 1, 2011, normalized to 0. Panel (b) presents
the equivalent coefficient estimates and associated 95% confidence intervals when equation 1 is
estimated using 3, 4,...,12 month-of-birth cohorts on either side of the threshold.
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Figure 2.10: Average Number of Hours Worked at November 2011
(a)
(b)
Notes: Average number of hours worked by the mother as of November 2011. In panel (a), each
data point corresponds to the average value of each outcome by month of birth of the child in 1-
month bins. The window includes all children born to mothers from January 2010 until November
2011. The vertical line denotes the PPL cutoff of January 1, 2011, normalized to 0. Panel (b)
presents the equivalent coefficient estimates and associated 95% confidence intervals when equation
1 is estimated using 3, 4,...,12 month-of-birth cohorts on either side of the threshold.
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2.8 Tables
Table 2.1: Discontinuity in Births at the January 1, 2011 Threshold
2-2m 2-2m 2-2m 1-1m 1-1m 1-1m
Births 0.098 0.055 0.120 0.127 0.043 -0.047
(0.082) (0.125) (0.166) (0.120) (0.168) (0.189)
N (Number of Days) 120 120 120 62 62 62
Linear term in m Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic term in m No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Cubic term in m No No Yes No No Yes
Notes: Each coefficient reported is the estimated discontinuity in the daily number of logged births at the threshold
as a result of the PPL scheme. The ‘m’ in each column heading stands for months. Each coefficient is from a different
regression. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics of Analysis Variables
Pre-PPL Post-PPL
Panel I: Outcomes
Percentage receiving Baby Bonus 68.13 19.00
(5.647) (8.183)
Average number of weeks stopped work before birth 3.858 3.864
(0.979) (0.775)
Average number of hours worked before stopped for birth (per week) 30.07 31.07
(2.021) (2.306)
Average age of the child when the mother returned to work (in weeks) 30.41 12.54
(5.804) (7.712)
Average number of hours worked in all jobs (per week) 16.04 4.564
(3.865) (3.507)
N (number of months) 11 12
Panel II: Covariates
Australian born (mother) 78.33 80.18
(5.584) (7.324)
Age of partner 35.24 34.22
(1.154) (0.877)
Age of mother 32.59 31.45
(1.067) (0.943)
Only child 49.48 49.33
(8.067) (6.090)
N (number of months) 11 12
Notes: Data on each outcome was provided by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. The covariates in
Panel II are: the percentage of mothers who are Australian born, the average age of the mother’s partner,
the average age of the mother, and the percentage of mothers with only one child. Means and standard
deviations (in parentheses) are presented.
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Table 2.3: Baby Bonus Receipt
12-12m 12-12m 12-12m
Baby Bonus -46.24*** -44.52*** -43.06***
(6.595) (10.11) (7.703)
N (Number of Months) 23 23 23
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Linear term in m Yes No No
Quadratic term in m No Yes No
Cubic term in m No No Yes
Notes: The coefficient reported is the estimated discontinuity in Baby Bonus Receipt as a result of the PPL scheme.
The ‘m’ in the column heading stands for months. An observation is the outcome rate for a one month age cell.
Controls include the percentage of mothers in each age cell that are Australian born, the average age of the mother in
each age cell, the average age of the partner in each age cell, and the percentage of mothers with one child in each age
cell. Estimates are weighted by the population, and robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
Table 2.4: The Effect of PPL on Maternal Labor Market Outcomes
Hours Before
Birth
Weeks Stop
Before Birth
Age of Child
Return
Hours Worked,
Nov ’11
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel I
PPL 0.046 -0.171 0.905** -0.202
(0.059) (0.195) (0.357) (0.221)
N (Number of Months) 23 23 23 23
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear term in m Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel II
PPL 0.042 -0.324 0.036 -0.101
(0.112) (0.272) (0.207) (0.390)
N (Number of Months) 23 23 23 23
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic term in m Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The coefficient reported is the estimated discontinuity in the outcome as a result of the PPL scheme. Each
coefficient is from a different regression. An observation is the outcome rate for a one month age cell. Controls include
the percentage of mothers in each age cell that are Australian born, the average age of the mother in each age cell, the
average age of the partner in each age cell, and the percentage of mothers with one child in each age cell. Estimates
are weighted by the population, and robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.5: Average Age of the Child when the Mother Returned to Work, by Income Quintile
1st Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile 5th Quintile
Panel I
Avg. Age of Child -0.153 1.012 1.248 0.171 0.529
(0.771) (0.675) (1.074) (0.529) (0.466)
N (Number of Months) 23 23 23 23 23
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear term in m Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel II
Avg. Age of Child 0.067 0.325 1.160 0.965 0.219
(1.325) (0.697) (1.480) (0.764) (0.837)
N (Number of Months) 23 23 23 23 23
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quadratic term in m Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Each coefficient reported is the estimated discontinuity in the outcome as a result of the PPL scheme. Each
coefficient is from a different regression. An observation is the outcome rate for a one month age cell. Controls include
the percentage of mothers in each age cell that are Australian born, the average age of the mother in each age cell, the
average age of the partner in each age cell, and the percentage of mothers with one child in each age cell. Estimates
are weighted by the population, and robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
78
Chapter 3
The Effect of Technology Investment
on Student Achievement
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3.1 Introduction
“I can’t stress enough, education is the single most important investment we can make in our
future, and technology is the tool for the greatest return. Technology has the power to enhance
the work of our educators and create a more immersive and engaging learning experience for
students.” – Margo Day, Vice President of U.S. Education for Microsoft
Educational technology in schools has substantially increased in the past decade. The num-
ber of laptops and tablets in U.S. K-12 schools grew by 363 percent over the past seven
years, from roughly 3 million devices in 2010 to almost 14 million in 2017 (Bushweller,
2017). By the end of 2015, the U.S. spent $4.7 billion on instructional technology in K-12
schools (Schaffhauser, 2016). While in office, President Obama called for nearly $3 billion in
commitments from the Federal Communications Commission and many private technology
companies with an aim to “close the technology gap in our schools” (Bidwell, 2014). More-
over, an increasing number of schools are experimenting with one-to-one laptop programs
that provide each student with a computer to use in the classroom, and often at home (Bul-
man & Fairlie, 2016).1 Many proponents of providing more technology to schools hope that
additional access will help close some achievement gaps, while opponents argue that such im-
provements are overvalued because little evidence exists that technology improves teaching
and learning (McDermott & Gormley, 2016). Given the recent sizable increase in technol-
ogy spending, and technology in the classroom, an understanding of whether technology
improves student achievement is of critical interest to policymakers.
How can investments in technology affect student achievement? The answer to this question
is not necessarily clear. To take some examples, technology investment could facilitate or
1According to a 2016 “Technology in the Classroom” survey by Front Row Education, educators say the
increase in access to technology devices is driving the increase in technology use in the classroom, with over
50 percent of teachers indicating they have a one-to-one computer-student ratio, up 25 percent over the
past year.
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enhance existing computer-based instruction. To the extent that computer-based instruc-
tion is more effective than traditional classroom-based instruction - because instruction can
be tailored to an individual student’s needs and can proceed at a pace appropriate to an
individual student - teachers might increase the amount of time devoted to computer-based
instruction. However, if teachers do increase the amount of time devoted to computer-based
instruction and it has smaller returns than traditional instruction (e.g. if technology is
used for non-instructional purposes), technology investment could potentially harm student
achievement. Technology investment could also narrow or widen some achievement gaps. In
addition to the individualized, self-paced instruction that technology provides, data-driven
computer-based instruction can help teachers to identify areas of weakness and work individ-
ually with struggling students, thereby improving their academic achievement. On the other
hand, students at the top end of the achievement distribution may benefit more from the
individualized and self-paced instruction, since they can likely obtain more subject-specific
information in a computer-based classroom as opposed to a traditional classroom. These
factors, in addition to the direct benefits of computer literacy, are behind the decision of
schools to invest in educational technology.
A key challenge in analyzing the effect of technology investment on student achievement is
that investments in technology are likely to be correlated with unobserved characteristics that
affect achievement. In order to isolate the causal effect of technology investment on student
achievement, exogenous variation in technology investment is necessary. This paper seeks to
provide a causal estimate for the effect of technology investment on student achievement.
In this paper, I analyze the effect of technology investment on student achievement using a
large scale technology expansion program in California K-12 public schools which subsidized
the purchase of technology hardware and software products. The California Education Tech-
nology K-12 Voucher Program (hereafter “the voucher program”) provided public schools,
in which at least 40 percent of students were categorically eligible to receive free or reduced-
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price meals through the National School Lunch Program, with $50.80 per pupil in technology
vouchers to reimburse their purchases of qualifying computer technology hardware and soft-
ware products and services. California is the largest public school system in the US, serving
over 6 million students, yet continuously ranks near the bottom for technology resources in
K-12 public schools (National Center for Education Statistics, 2013).2 The primary goal of
the voucher program was to improve technology access and assist California K-12 schools
with implementing and supporting education technology. Since vouchers were allocated to
schools based on their percentage of students who qualify for free and reduced price meals,
I employ a regression discontinuity design that allows comparisons across schools that are
very similar in school and student characteristics, but different in their access to technology
resources. Using data on voucher eligibility and voucher spending, I estimate the causal
impact of voucher spending on student achievement.
The results of this study indicate that voucher spending significantly increased academic
achievement among elementary and middle school students. I find that schools which were
eligible for and spent the technology voucher had significantly greater gains in achievement
than schools which were not eligible for the voucher. Since policymakers typically want to
implement policies that channel additional funds to where they will be used most effectively, I
test for heterogeneity in treatment effects across school and student characteristics, including
school type, student socio-economic status, and baseline levels of computer stock. I find the
effect of voucher spending on student achievement is largest for middle school students,
and is driven by the increase in test scores for low-socioeconomic students. This finding
suggests that technology investment can help narrow the income achievement gap. I also
find some evidence that schools with high levels of initial computer stock had significant
gains in academic achievement. Finally, I explore whether voucher spending affected specific
inputs to education production, including the number of instructional computers per student,
2In 2004, California was ranked 50th in the nation, behind Nevada, in the number of students per computer,
with 5.1 compared to the national average of 3.8. California ranked 47th in the percentage of computers
with Internet access, with 83 percent compared to the national average of 87 percent (Sack, 2005).
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the number of classrooms with Internet, and the number of computer education courses
offered. I find suggestive evidence that voucher spending marginally increased the number
of instructional computers per student, and increased the number of computer education
courses offered.
This study contributes to the literature on the effect of technology and student achievement
in two important ways. First, very few studies have examined the effect of technology
investment on student achievement, and the limited evidence that exists is mixed (J. Angrist
& Lavy, 2002; Goolsbee & Guryan, 2006; Leuven et al., 2007; Machin et al., 2007).3 These
studies typically use quasi-experimental designs in settings outside the U.S.4, and exploit
governmental policies that provide subsidies or funding for schools to invest in computer
technology. These studies typically find that technology investment does increase computer
use in school, but has little to no positive and significant effect on most academic outcomes.
The one exception to the null findings on student achievement is Machin et al. (2007), who
employ an instrumental variables strategy and find that funding for technology in English
primary schools significantly increases student achievement. Since our understanding of the
impact of technology investments on student achievement is still limited, my study seeks to
provide additional insights on this highly debated topic. Moreover, only one of the previous
studies has looked at the impact of technology investments in the U.S., and this paper
adds to the scant evidence in the U.S. Second, I examine heterogeneity in the effect of
additional funding for technology resources on student achievement by school characteristics
and student subgroups. Very little attention is given in the prior literature to heterogeneous
treatment effects by school characteristics and subgroups, and this paper sheds light on how
the effect of technology investment varies across these dimensions.
Unlike most previous studies, the findings of this study show that technology investment
3See Escueta et al. (2017) for an experimental evidence review on the effects of home computers, computer-
aided instruction, technology-enable behavioral interventions, and online learning.
4The one exception is Goolsbee and Guryan (2006), who study the impact of the E-rate program in California.
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can significantly improve student achievement. The positive results found here can likely be
attributed to schools’ effective use of the voucher. That is, since the voucher could be used
to purchase hardware or software products, in addition to support and professional devel-
opment, schools were likely using the voucher in the most effective way to improve student
achievement. Moreover, much of the previous literature examined the effect of technology
investment in the late 1990s or early 2000s. The educational technology climate has dra-
matically changed in the past decade. Not only did computers become more commonplace
in the classroom, but the Internet and educational software has become increasingly more
sophisticated, changing the way technology is used for teaching and learning (Svokos, 2018).
Given that technology use in the classroom has significantly evolved, it is not surprising that
as technology becomes more integrated into the classroom, it can have positive effects on
student achievement.5
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I provide background on
the California Education Technology K-12 Voucher Program. In Section 3, I explain the
empirical strategy which underlies the analysis. In Section 4, I describe the data and how
these data are used to estimate the effect of the technology voucher program on student
achievement. In Section 5, I present the empirical results. Finally, in Section 6, I present a
discussion of the main findings and my conclusions.
3.2 CA Education Technology K-12 Voucher Program
The California Education Technology K-12 Voucher Program is a grant opportunity that
was made available through a Settlement Agreement between California consumers and
Microsoft Corporation in 2003. The settlement stems from a 1999 class-action lawsuit filed
5In fact, as of 2011, six states expanded their definition of a “textbook” to include electronic materials,
computers, or other portable personal computing devices, and two states require their Department of
Education to provide technical training and professional development for teachers in the effective use of
online learning resources (NCSL, 2011).
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in California that accused Microsoft of overcharging customers for its software. A fund equal
to two-thirds of the unclaimed and unredeemed portion of the $1.1 billion settlement was
allocated to eligible K-12 public schools in the form of vouchers to reimburse their purchases
of qualifying computer technology products and services. The first distribution of $250
million in technology vouchers was available to eligible schools beginning in November 2006.
Subsequently, in November 2010, the second round of vouchers totaling $25.5 million was
announced, and additional disbursements were announced in March 2014 and January 2015
of $188.4 million and $6.5 million, respectively. Local education agencies (LEAs) had until
September 25, 2015, to redeem all vouchers from the first four disbursements.
Eligible schools included all public kindergarten through grade twelve schools, county offices
of education, direct-funded charter schools, and State Special Schools in which at least 40
percent of the certified Census Day enrollment met the income eligibility guidelines or were
categorically eligible to receive free or reduced-price meals (FRPM) through the National
School Lunch Program.6 Additionally, all public high schools that serve students from
eligible public elementary, middle, and junior high schools in California are also eligible for
the voucher. That is, if high school #1 has a FRPM percentage equal to 30% and does
not qualify for the voucher on its own, but serves students from a qualifying elementary
or middle school, then high school #1 will also qualify for the voucher. Given this “feeder
provision”, nearly all high schools in California qualify for the voucher program, and there
is no longer a clear exogenous shock to technology to exploit. Therefore, this analysis will
focus on elementary and middle schools, where the 40% cutoff is well-defined.
The amount of each voucher is based on the total enrollment at eligible schools. Fifty percent
of the total amount is distributed in the form of General Purpose vouchers (GPV) and fifty
percent is distributed in the form of Specific Category Software vouchers (SCV). For the
6Schools with enrollment less than 300 were given “special consideration” for the voucher, meaning that
some schools with enrollment less than 300 that did not qualify for the voucher still received it. Thus, these
schools are dropped from the analysis.
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2006 disbursement, eligible schools could receive $50.80 per pupil in technology vouchers -
nearly half of the average expenditure per student for instructional technology (California
Department of Education, 2011).78 Additionally, in order to receive the education technology
voucher funds, county offices of education, school districts, or direct-funded charter schools
must have an approved education technology plan.9 GPVs can be used to purchase specific
hardware used with any operating system platform, any non-custom software for that hard-
ware, evaluation tools, IT support services, and professional development services. SCVs
can only be utilized to purchase specific categories of software that are published or sold by
any software provider.10 Each voucher is redeemed via a redemption form that each district
submits, along with invoices for every purchase, to the Settlement Claims Administrator.
Districts are typically reimbursed for their qualifying purchases within 30 days of submitting
the redemption form.
3.3 Empirical Methods
I exploit the 40% FRPM eligibility cutoff in the technology voucher program and use a
regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of the voucher program on student
achievement (D. S. Lee & Lemieux, 2010). To understand my estimation strategy, let us first
assume that I can measure voucher spending at the school-level. With data at the school-
7Average expenditures per student for instructional library, media, and technology, which includes expenses
for instructional technology, in California public schools are roughly $120 (California Department of Edu-
cation, 2011).
8An obvious concern is that schools could reallocate funds that would have been used for technology in
the absence of the voucher program to other school inputs, like health and counseling services, physical
education, etc. To test if this is the case, I would require expenditure data at the school-level on technology-
related expenses, and other school expenses. Unfortunately, expenditure data is only available at the
district-level, and there is no distinct technology-related expense category. However, anecdotal evidence
suggests that schools were not reallocating money initially earmarked for technology, and schools were
simply supplementing their initial technology budget with the voucher funds.
9The purpose of an educational technology plan is to guide the use of technology, by establishing clear
goals and a realistic, comprehensive strategy to improve education through technology (CA Department of
Education, 2018).
10See Table 3.10 for examples of qualifying GPV and SCV products and services.
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level, I would estimate the relationship between voucher spending and student achievement
using a “fuzzy” regression discontinuity framework. The first-stage estimates the relationship
between voucher program eligibility and voucher spending at the school-level:
V oucherSpendings = β0 + β1Eligibles + f(FRPMs) + νs (3.1)
where V oucherSpendings is an indicator for school s spending their voucher; Eligibles is
an indicator equal to 1 if school s has a FRPM percentage ≥ 40%; and f(FRPMs) is a
functional form relating FRPM percentage to V oucherSpendings. The parameter of interest,
β1, captures the effect of the technology voucher program on school-level voucher spending.
Next, I would estimate the second-stage, which defines the relationship between voucher
spending and student achievement:
Achievementgs = γ0 + γ1V oucherSpendings + f(FRPMs) + gs (3.2)
where Achievementsg is the change in test scores (i.e. scorepost − scorepre) for math and
English for grade g in school s. The parameter of interest, γ1, captures the effect of voucher
spending on student achievement. Since voucher spending is not randomly assigned, I would
use eligibility status as an instrument for voucher spending, and estimate γ1 via two-stage
least squares.
In practice, however, my measure of voucher spending is at the district-level, not the school-
level. To disaggregate the district-level spending data to the school-level, I assume if a
district spends nearly 100% of their voucher, then every school that was eligible for the
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voucher within that district must have spent their voucher. Therefore, I restrict the sample
to districts (and the schools within those districts) that spent nearly 100% of their technology
voucher. This procedure is described in detail in section 3.4.1. This assumption will generate
a β1=1 in equation 1, thereby reducing the above “fuzzy” regression discontinuity framework
to the sharp regression discontinuity framework, where treatment status is fully determined
as a function of FRPM (D. S. Lee & Lemieux, 2010). Therefore, I estimate the reduced-form
effects for those schools who are eligible and spent the voucher. Specifically, I estimate the
following model:
Achievementgs = δ0 + δ1Eligibles + f(FRPMs) + ψgs (3.3)
I augment this equation with controls for school and student-specific characteristics to po-
tentially reduce the residual variation in the outcome, and increase the precision of the
estimates. I include a vector Xs of school characteristics, including enrollment, percent of
schools located in rural counties, percent female students, percent white, percent black, per-
cent hispanic, and the number of test-taking students. However, the inclusion of X should
not affect the estimates of δ1, since for schools near the 40% eligibility cutoff, the elements
of X should be uncorrelated with being on either side of the threshold.
The parameter of interest is δ1 - the effect of the technology voucher program on student
achievement.11 This parameter is estimated using a local linear regression approach (Imbens
& Lemieux, 2008; D. S. Lee & Lemieux, 2010), with a bandwidth of 0.10 on each side of the
FRPM percentage threshold.12
11Equation 3 will also be used to estimate the effect of the technology voucher program on other outcomes
of interest, including technology stock and the number of elective courses offered.
12I use cross-validation procedures to determine the optimal bandwidth for each outcome. Generally, the
CV plots produced an optimal bandwidth around 0.10 for each outcome. Robustness of the results to
alternative bandwidth choices are also presented in the figures below.
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A key assumption underlying the regression discontinuity procedure is that the conditional
expectations of the outcomes (e.g. test scores) with respect to FRPM percentage are smooth
through the 40% cut point. If this is the case, I can attribute any discontinuities at this
threshold to the causal effect of the technology voucher program. Although I cannot test
this assumption directly, an implication is that there should be no discontinuities in prede-
termined outcomes.13
I test for discontinuities in predetermined characteristics of schools, students, and teachers
using the restricted sample. I examine if any discontinuities in enrollment size, the percentage
of schools located in rural counties, the percentage of students who are female, white, black,
and hispanic, the percentage of teachers with a minimum of five years of experience, the
percentage of teachers who are female, the pupil-teacher ratio, and baseline test scores exist.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 plot the distribution of these predetermined characteristics for the 2005-
2006 school year, and the corresponding local linear regression estimates. In Figure 3.1, there
is no evidence of a discontinuity at the 40% FRPM cutoff for any of these outcomes. In Figure
3.2, there is evidence of a small negative discontinuity in the percentage of students who are
black. This difference is controlled for, along with all other school and student characteristics,
to increase the precision of the estimates.
The other key identification issue for the regression discontinuity method is to what extent
schools could have influenced the percentage of students who meet the income eligibility
guidelines or are categorically eligible to receive free or reduced-price meals in anticipation
of the voucher program. For the 2006 voucher disbursement, school eligibility was based on
the FRPM percentage from the preceding school year (i.e. 2005-2006 school year). I test
for manipulation at the threshold by performing a density test of the number of schools on
13It is also key that no other school funding formulas adopted the 40% eligibility cut point in 2006. Title 1
funds - federal funds used to help meet the educational needs of students - used for school-wide programs
designed to upgrade their entire educational programs are allocated to schools enrolling at least 40 percent
of children from low-income families. However, schools in California can be granted a waiver if they do
not meet the 40% low-income criteria, where schools with 30% of students from low-income families, for
example, could receive Title 1 funds.
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each side of the 40% eligibility threshold (McCrary, 2008). Figure 3.3 presents the density
plot and corresponding local linear regression estimate. Visually there does not appear to
be a discontinuity at the 40% FRPM threshold, and the estimated effect is statistically in-
significant, suggesting that schools were not manipulating their FRPM percentage in order
to qualify for the technology voucher. Therefore, in the absence of manipulation and af-
ter controlling for discontinuities in predetermined school and student characteristics, the
estimates of δ1 can be interpreted as the local average treatment effect - the effect of an
additional $50.80 per pupil of technology spending for schools that would not have increased
their technology spending in the absence of the technology voucher program.
3.4 Data
This study uses data from two sources to analyze the effect of technology investment on
student achievement: the Settlement Claims Administrator (SCA) Education Technology
K-12 Voucher Program Balance Statements, and the California Department of Education.
These datasets are summarized in Figure 3.11. As stated above, in order to estimate the
causal effect of technology spending on student achievement using the above “fuzzy” regres-
sion discontinuity framework presented with equations 1 and 2, I would require data at the
school-level on technology spending made through the technology voucher program. I en-
counter one main obstacle in obtaining school-level technology spending data made through
the voucher program. Below, I describe in detail how I address this challenge, and how
I arrive at the sample used to estimate the reduced-form equation presented in equation
3. I then describe the California Department of Education outcome data, which includes
school-level student achievement measures.
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3.4.1 SCA Data and Sample Construction
The SCA Balance Statements provide information about each K-12 public school district
in California that was eligible and received a technology voucher. A district is eligible if
at least one school within the district is eligible. Information is available on which eligible
districts obtained a voucher, how much each district spent, and when the voucher was spent.
Specifically, the Balance Statements include the district identification number, the district
name, the amount of the GPV and SCV (since half of each voucher is in the form of GPV
and the other half is in the form of SCV). Additionally, the Balance Statement records the
beginning balance of each voucher, and each disbursement (there were four disbursements
of technology vouchers from 2006 until 2015), and reimbursement. Figure 3.12 displays a
screenshot of the SCA Balance Statement website for Anaheim City School District, as an
example.
Since the voucher program operates at the school-level, it would be ideal if information on
the beginning balance of each voucher, each disbursement, and each voucher reimbursement
was also available at the school-level. This would allow me to identify which schools spent
their voucher, and when. Because this information is only available at the district-level, I
make one main assumption to disaggregate it to the school-level. Since I know each district’s
beginning balance, and how much of the voucher a district spends and when, I can calculate
the percentage of the total voucher spent beginning in 2006. If the district spent nearly 100%
of their voucher at any point in time, then every school that was eligible for the voucher
within the district must have spent their voucher. Therefore, I restrict the sample to districts
that spent at least 90% of their voucher by October 2010.14 That is, all schools within the
districts that did not spend at least 90% of their voucher by October 2010 are dropped
14The 90% restriction is used, as opposed to 100%, to increase the number of observations around the 40%
FRPM threshold. Estimates for the main outcomes of interest using 80% and 70% are presented in Table
3.12. The estimates become smaller in magnitude and less precise, as expected, since more schools that
did not spent their voucher are included in the sample and downward biasing the estimates.
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from the sample.15 Figure 3.13 shows the distribution of percent spent by district. The
distribution is bi-model, with a large fraction of districts not spending any of their voucher
by October 2010, and a large, but slightly smaller fraction of districts spending all of their
voucher by October 2010. Districts to the left of “0.9” are dropped from the sample.16
I restrict the sample to voucher spending by October 2010 for two reasons. First, the second
round of vouchers were disbursed in November 2010, where schools that did not qualify for the
first round of vouchers could be eligible for the second round. Since there was manipulation
around the November 2010 voucher distribution 40% FRPM threshold (i.e. a violation of
the regression discontinuity identifying assumptions), utilizing this cutoff and including the
schools just above and just below the threshold would not yield causal estimates.17 Second,
since the focus of this paper is on the first voucher distribution that occurred in 2006, it is
reasonable to assume that it may take time for schools to spend their vouchers, for teachers
to adapt to new technology, or obtain the necessary training in order to effectively integrate
15To determine if a district spent at least 90% of their voucher, let us take the example of Anaheim City
School District’s SCA balance statement in Figure 3.12. To begin, I add the values in “GPV Balance” and
“SV Balance” for the “Beginning Balance” action to get the beginning balance for each district. Consistent
with the rules as described by the SCA for determining the total voucher amount each school receives (i.e.
$50.80 per pupil), I can construct beginning balances similar to those in the SCA data using (a) number of
students enrolled, and (b) whether or not the school had at least 40% of students qualify for FRPM. These
calculations do not match exactly, given the feeder school provision and special consideration for small
schools, which could have qualified for the voucher based on other characteristics besides the 40% FRPM
cutoff. I then add together all “Payments” for the GPV and SV until October 2010. To determine percent
spent, I divide the total payment by beginning balance. For Anaheim City School District, they received
vouchers totaling slightly over $1 million (representing only 1% of their total budget), and spent 88% of their
voucher. Thus, Anaheim City School District is dropped from the sample. The SCA Balance Statements
for all eligible districts are available here: https://edtechk12vp.com/admin/statementAdmin.aspx.
16Since policymakers are typically interested in knowing the impact of an implemented policy on the pop-
ulation it targets, I report the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates for the effect of the Technology Voucher
Program on mathematics and English test scores for elementary and middle schools combined. That is,
I include all schools in Figure 3.13 - schools within districts that did and did not spend at least 90% of
the voucher by 2010. Tables 3.13 through 3.15 report the ITT estimates. The ITT estimates suggest that
the technology voucher program does not significantly impact math or English achievement. The ITT
estimates are much smaller than the estimates presented in Tables 3.3-3.5, which is expected given the
sample restrictions imposed.
17Figure 3.14 displays the distribution of the number of schools on each side of the 40% eligibility threshold
and corresponding local linear regression estimate for the 2009-2010 school year, since eligibility was based
on the prior school year FRPM data. There is a clear discontinuity in the number of schools around
the 40% FRPM threshold, suggesting that schools manipulated FRPM counts in order to qualify for the
technology voucher program.
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the technology into the classroom. Thus, we might not expect to see effects of the voucher
program in the first few years after initial disbursement.
Figure 3.4 displays the evolution of the sample creation. Beginning with the district-level
SCA data, 809 school districts received the first voucher disbursement. Of the 809 school
districts, 180 districts (22.2%) spent at least 90% of their initial voucher distribution by
October 2010 and 629 districts did not. Disaggregating this to the school-level, 8,611 schools
are in the 809 school districts that received the initial voucher disbursement. There are 1,675
schools within the 180 school districts that spent at least 90% of their voucher by October
2010. Within the 629 districts, I drop 6,933 schools because they did not spend at least
90% their initial voucher disbursement by October 2010. Of the 1,675 schools, 1,026 schools
were eligible for the voucher, and 649 were not. The final sample, however, is restricted to
elementary and middle schools with enrollment greater than 300 students, since the primary
analysis is focused on students in grades 2-8.18 After eliminating the high schools and schools
with less than 300 students enrolled, the final sample contains 1,041 elementary and middle
schools, 696 of which were eligible for and spent the voucher, and 345 of which were not
eligible.19
How do the schools within the districts that were dropped compare to schools within the
districts that were not? Table 3.1 provides school-level sample means for school characteris-
tics and student and teacher demographics for the full sample of CA elementary and middle
schools, and schools within 10 percentage points of the FRPM cut point that belong to dis-
tricts that were dropped from the sample, and districts that were kept in the sample, for the
2005-2006 baseline school year. The first panel reports school characteristics, including the
number of schools within districts that were and were not dropped from the sample, total
18Recall schools with enrollment less than 300 were given “special consideration” for the voucher, meaning
that some schools with enrollment less than 300 that did not qualify for the voucher still received it. Thus,
these schools are dropped from the analysis.
19The total amount of the technology voucher spent by schools by October 2010 amounted to $42,686,360 -
roughly 17% of the initial $250 million disbursement.
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enrollment, the percentage of schools in rural counties, and FRPM percentage. The number
of schools within the districts that spent at least 90% of their voucher is significantly less
than the number of schools within the districts that were dropped. This is not surprising
since smaller school districts are more likely able to spend nearly all of their voucher within
the time period.20 A slightly higher percentage of schools within districts that spent their
voucher are located in rural counties, which again, is not surprising given rural counties
have fewer schools per district than urban districts. The top panel also shows that total
enrollment and FRPM percentage are nearly identical across the two groups.
Panel 2 of Table 3.1 compares student and teacher demographics. I find no differences in
terms of the percentage of students who are female and the percentage of students who are
white between the two samples. However, the schools within districts that spent their voucher
have significantly less students who are black, and significantly more hispanic students,
although the latter is only marginally significant. I also find no stark differences in the
percentage of teachers with a minimum of five years of experience (though the difference
is marginally significant), the percentage of teachers who are female, or the pupil-teacher
ratio. Despite the difference in the number of schools and the percentage of students who
are black within the districts that did and did not spend their voucher, panels 1 and 2
of Table 3.1 suggest that the districts that spent most of their voucher by October 2010
are very comparable to the districts that did not in terms of school, student, and teacher
characteristics.
The final panel of Table 3.1 compares the main outcomes of interest. Panel 3 of Table 3.1
suggests that schools within districts that did not spend their voucher by October 2010
had significantly lower levels of technology stock (computers per student and the number of
classrooms with Internet) compared to schools within districts that did spend their voucher.
20Los Angeles County School District has over 1,000 schools, compared to Livermore Valley Joint Unified
which has 17. Livermore Valley Joint Unified School district spent nearly 100 percent of their voucher,
whereas LA County School District only spent 25 percent. This difference could potentially be due to
smaller districts having more coordination among schools, or stronger leadership among decision makers.
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English and math test scores do not appear to differ between schools within districts that did
and did not spend their voucher. Therefore, these comparisons suggest that non-spending
districts had lower levels of technology stock, and may suggest that schools within districts
that did spend their voucher potentially had enough existing technology stock to make more
efficient use of the technology voucher. That is, given that they had significantly more
computers per student and classrooms connected to the Internet, these schools may have
been able to utilize their technology voucher more effectively, by for example, investing in
more educational software and teacher training.
To summarize, since technology expenditures are not available at the school-level, I use
district-level data from the SCA and restrict the estimation sample to only schools within
districts that spent at least 90% of their voucher by October 2010. Table 3.1 compares
schools within districts that did not spend at least 90% of their technology voucher by Oc-
tober 2010 to schools within districts that did (i.e. the “early spenders”) on a number of
characteristics. Panels 1 and 2 of Table 3.1 suggests that early spending districts are very
comparable to the districts that did not spend their voucher by 2010 in terms of school,
student, and teacher characteristics (including test scores). However, early spenders have
significantly more technology stock than non-early spenders, suggesting these districts poten-
tially had enough existing technology stock to make proper use of the technology voucher.
Moreover, since districts were required to have an approved educational technology plan,
early spending districts had already established clear goals and a realistic, comprehensive
strategy to improve education through technology, which likely enabled them to use the
technology voucher more effectively. Finally, to circle back to the empirical strategy, given
the sample restrictions discussed above, the estimates of δ1 in equation 3 can still be inter-
preted as local average treatment effects (LATE), but will likely be larger than typical LATE
estimates, since the analysis is focused on early spenders who likely have the most to gain
(in terms of student achievement) from the voucher program.
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3.4.2 CA Department of Education Data
The CA Department of Education (CA DOE) provides data across many years at the district,
school, and grade-level on a wide variety of topics, including test results, technology stock,
student and teacher demographics, and time base allocated to courses. These data are
well suited for this study for several reasons. First, the CA DOE data contains school-
level California Standards Test (CST) mean scale scores for mathematics and English by
grade-level, which will allow me to estimate the effect of technology spending on student
performance for elementary and middle schoolers.21 Second, school-level CST scores are
available by student subgroups, including socio-economic status, which allow me to estimate
the heterogeneous effects of technology spending. Third, data are available at the school-
level on the number of computers per student, and the number of classrooms with Internet.
With these data I am able to determine if technology stock changed as a result of the
voucher program. Fourth, the CA DOE data also include staff assignment and course data,
including the number of computer education courses offered, and the amount of class time
in the school day allocated to mathematics and English. With these data I am able to
analyze if the technology voucher affected the number of computer education courses offered
or instructional time for mathematics and English - potential mechanisms through which
technology investment could affect student performance. Finally, these data contain school-
level information on Census Day enrollment and the percentage of students who qualify for
free or reduced-price meals.
Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics on the primary outcomes of interest, including tech-
nology stock, CST test scores for English and mathematics, and other outcomes of interest
for the estimation sample population and for the subsamples of schools within 10 percentage
points of the 40% FRPM threshold. The top panel displays the technology stock statistics
21Mean scale scores are used to equate the CST scores from year to year and to determine performance
levels. The CST score is the arithmetic mean or average of the scale scores for all students who took each
grade- and/or content-specific CST without modifications (California Department of Education, 2011).
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for both elementary and middle schools combined for the 2010-2011 school year. Technology
stock includes the number of computers per school used for instructional purposes that are
less than 48 months old, and the number of classrooms per school with an Internet connec-
tion. Since the sample is restricted to schools within districts that spent at least 90% of
their voucher by the end of 2010, we would expect to see changes in the technology stock
in these schools by this time. The CA DOE requires schools to report specific data, such
as the number of students, the number of certified and classified staff, technology stock,
and a number of other counts, by October 31 of that school year. Thus, the technology
stock counts for the 2010-2011 school year are reported by October 31, 2010. According to
Table 3.2, schools within 10 percentage points of the 40% threshold have a similar number
of computers per student, and classrooms connected to the Internet.
The following two panels display the average change from 2006 to 2011 in CST test scores
for English and mathematics, by elementary and middle schools. The student achievement
outcome of interest is: testscore2011 − testscore2006. For English scores, the change in test
scores for elementary schools just above the 40% threshold is lower, while the change in
scores for middle schools is significantly higher. For mathematics scores, eligible elementary
schools have a slightly smaller change in test scores compared to ineligible schools, whereas
eligible middle schools have a larger change in test scores compared to ineligible schools.
The final panel displays the number of computer education courses offered, and the average
instructional time spent teaching English, and mathematics for the 2010-2011 school year
for middle schools.22 Schools just above the 40% cut point offer more computer education
courses and spend more slightly more instructional time in mathematics and English courses
than those schools just below the cut point, but the mean differences are not statistically
different.
22Elementary schools typically have a set curriculum where class time spent in each common core subject
does not differ across schools. Middle schools, however, have more discretion regarding their time allocation
to courses.
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To summarize, the patterns observed in Table 3.2 suggest that eligible schools just above the
40% threshold have higher middle school English achievement. Next, I present more rigorous
evidence of the effect of the voucher program on student achievement and other outcomes
using the regression discontinuity empirical strategy described above.
3.5 Estimation Results
The main results presented below are estimated using local linear regressions with a band-
width of 10 percentage points, unless otherwise noted. All regressions include controls for
school characteristics, including enrollment, percent of schools located in rural counties, per-
cent female students, percent white, percent black, percent hispanic, and the number of
test-taking students (for student achievement outcomes). I show plots of the distribution
of the main outcomes of interest and fitted values from local linear regressions, where the
running variable, FRPM, is always normalized to be 0 at the 40% cutoff. I also show plots
of the distribution of estimates obtained using varying bandwidths for the main outcomes
of interest.
3.5.1 Student Achievement
I begin by presenting the results for the effect of voucher spending on the change in school-
level CST mean scale scores from 2006-2011 pooling across elementary and middle schools
for mathematics and English. These subjects constitute two of the four main core subjects
taught in elementary and middle schools and serve as important indicators of school per-
formance. Table 3.3 reports these estimates. Column 1 of Table 3.3 indicates that voucher
spending had no statistically significant effect on mathematics test scores. Figure 3.5 panel
(a) plots the distribution of the change in mathematics test scores and corresponding re-
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gression estimate from column 1 of Table 3.3. Visually, there is no clear discontinuity in
test scores at the cut point. Figure 3.5 panel (c), displays the estimates and correspond-
ing 95% confidence intervals for varying bandwidths, and the effect of voucher spending on
mathematics test scores remains statistically insignificant and falls to zero as the bandwidth
increases.
Column 2 of Table 3.3 reports the results for English achievement for elementary and middle
schools. Voucher spending significantly increases English achievement by roughly one-third
of a standard deviation. Figure 3.5 panel (b) plots the distribution of the change in English
test scores and corresponding regression estimate from column 2 of Table 3.3. There is visual
evidence of a positive discontinuity in English test scores at the cut point. The estimate is
also fairly robust to varying bandwidths, with the estimate becoming slightly smaller as the
bandwidth increases, as seen in Figure 3.5 panel (d).23
Given that voucher spending appears to significantly increase achievement, it is important
to see if the effect was experienced equally across different school and student characteristics.
In Table 3.4, I disaggregate the pooled results in Table 3.3 by school type.24 Educational
technology tends to be used differently across grades. Elementary school teachers primarily
use technology to deliver instruction via interactive whiteboards, laptop computers, or pro-
jectors, whereas middle schoolers often use computers to solve math problems, write essays,
and conduct research on the Internet (ASCD, 2004; Harper & Milman, 2016; Smerdon et al.,
2000).25 Table 3.4 shows that voucher spending did not significantly impact mathematics
23I explore the sensitivity of the results to placebo thresholds (in 10 percentage point intervals) for voucher
eligibility. The results are presented in Table 3.16. The results show that there are no discontinuities in
test scores at any of the placebo thresholds.
24All students in grades 6-8 take the English CST, and all students in grades 6-7 takes the Math CST. Thus,
the number of observations is lower for middle school mathematics achievement.
25Indeed, educational technology is used more frequently to prepare written text, create visual displays,
learn and practice skills, conduct research, and develop presentations in English/language arts, foreign
languages, and social science than in mathematics, computer science, and science courses (Gray et al.,
2010). Moreover, anecdotal evidence also suggests that educational technology is used more heavily by
students in English/language arts classes than in mathematics in middle schools.
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test scores across school type, or significantly impact elementary English scores.26 However,
Table 3.4 does show that voucher spending had large positive and statistically significant
impacts on middle schoolers’ English test scores. The resulting discontinuity figure is dis-
played in Figure 3.6 panel (d). Across various bandwidths, the estimate is robust, although
slightly decreases in magnitude, suggesting that voucher spending significantly increases
middle schoolers’ English test scores by nearly one-half of a standard deviation.27
In Table 3.5, I disaggregate the results in Table 3.4 by socio-economic status. Since schools
had full discretion when spending the voucher, schools could have targeted the marginal dol-
lar towards particular student populations. Disadvantaged children typically do not perform
as well in school as their more advantaged counterparts (Battle & Lewis, 2002; V. E. Lee &
Burkam, 2002). As educator Benjamin S. Bloom observed, “teaching all students in the same
way and giving all the same time to learn (i.e. providing little variation in the instruction)
typically results in great variation in student learning” (Guskey, 2007). Educational tech-
nology can provide some of the necessary variation needed to close achievement gaps seen
among students by providing self-paced and differentiated instruction targeted towards the
strengths and weaknesses of the student. Moreover, children from disadvantaged households
typically have less access to home technology resources than their more advantaged peers
(Lynch, 2017). If the majority of technology exposure is happening in the classroom for
these students, technology may have differential impacts on their achievement.
Table 3.5 shows that low-SES elementary students have higher gains in mathematics than
their high-SES peers.28 Voucher spending increases low-SES mathematics elementary scores
by 0.30 standard deviations, though the estimate is not significantly different from zero. Low-
SES middle school students appear to have greater gains in English compared to high-SES
26The corresponding discontinuity figures for elementary math and English, and middle school math are
presented in Figure 3.6, panels (a)-(c). The corresponding figures with varying bandwidths are presented
in Figure 3.15, panels (a)-(c).
27See Figure 3.15 panel (d).
28The corresponding discontinuity figures and varying bandwidth figures are presented in Figures 3.16 and
3.17, respectively.
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middle school students, and appear to be driving the positive impact of voucher spending on
middle school English achievement. There appears to be no significant difference between
low and high-SES elementary students’ English test scores, but a clear difference in middle
school mathematics test scores between the two groups. Voucher spending increases low-SES
middle school mathematics scores by nearly one-third of a standard deviation, and decreases
high-SES scores by nearly one-half of a standard deviation, although both estimates are
statistically insignificant.29
It may also be the case that schools not only targeted the marginal dollar of the voucher to
particular student populations, but also according to their initial technology stock. Schools
with high initial levels of computer hardware may allocate their voucher funds differently
than schools with lower initial levels of computer hardware (by, for example, using the
voucher to purchase computer software instead of additional computer hardware), which
may have differential impacts on student achievement. To test this possibility, I interact
voucher eligibility with a dummy variable equal to 1 if a school’s initial computer stock (i.e.
number of computers per student) is in the top half of the initial computer stock distribution
for the sample. Table 3.6 reports the results from this specification. These results suggest
that being in the top half of initial computer stock distribution only significantly impacts
elementary English test scores. Across the other school type and subject, initial computer
stock does not appear to differently affect student achievement.30
29As a falsification test, I report the results for the effect of the technology voucher program on student
achievement by grade and SES for schools within districts that spent zero percent of their technology
voucher from 2006-2010. The estimates are presented in Table 3.17. There is no evidence of the technology
voucher program significantly impacting test scores for schools within districts that did not spend their
voucher.
30Similar specifications were also examined using the baseline pupil-teacher ratio and baseline school district
size, and no differential impact on student achievement was detected. These results are available from the
author upon request.
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3.5.2 Mechanisms
Given the positive effects of voucher spending on student achievement, a policy-relevant
question is whether changes to observed inputs can be credited as the likely source of the
achievement effects. To determine if voucher spending affected observed inputs in education
production, I focus on the number of computers per student used for instructional purposes,
the number of classrooms with Internet, the number of computer education and other elec-
tives courses offered, and instructional time spent in the mathematics and English courses.
I begin with the analysis of the effects of voucher spending on school-level technology stock,
including the number of computers per student used for instructional purposes that are less
than 48 months old, and the number of classrooms per school with Internet. Since half of
the technology voucher was disbursed in the form of GPVs for specific hardware purchases,
including computers, routers, wireless networks, and access points, we may expect voucher
receipt to increase these two types of technology stock. Table 3.7 presents the regression
discontinuity estimates of the effect of voucher spending on the number of computers per
student, and the logged number of classrooms per school with Internet, pooling elementary
and middle schools. For the 2010-2011 school year, column 1 reports the estimates for the
number of computers per student. The voucher program appears to increase the number of
computers per student by nearly 28%, but the estimate lacks precision. Figure 3.7 panel (a)
plots the distribution of the number of computers per student and corresponding regression
estimate from column 1 of Table 3.7. Visually, a clear change in the number of computers
per student is not evident for schools within the 10 percentage point bandwidth. Figure
3.7 panel (c), displays the estimates and corresponding 95% confidence intervals for varying
bandwidths. There is evidence that voucher spending does significantly impact the number
of computers per student within a tight bandwidth (between 5 and 10 percentage points).
However, as the bandwidth increases, the estimate falls to zero and becomes statistically
insignificant.
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Column 2 of Table 3.7 reports the estimate for the logged number of classrooms per school
with Internet. There is no evidence that the voucher program impacted the number of
classrooms per school with Internet. Figure 3.7 panel (b) plots the distribution of the logged
number of classrooms per school with Internet and corresponding regression estimate from
column 2 of Table 3.7. There is no clear discontinuity in the figure and as the bandwidth
around the 40% threshold increases (Figure 3.7 panel (d)), the estimate falls to zero.
I next report the results for the effect of voucher spending on technology stock by elementary
and middle schools separately in Table 3.8. Elementary and middle schools may have different
technology needs, and the aggregate results may mask potential heterogeneity. Similar to
Table 3.7, voucher spending does not appear to significantly impact the number of computers
per student for elementary or middle schools, or across any bandwidth. However, voucher
spending does significantly increase the number of classrooms with Internet in middle schools
by 68 percent, or 23 classrooms, but the effect nearly falls to zero and becomes statistically
insignificant as the bandwidth increases.
Given the achievement results, it is surprising that voucher spending had no robust effect
on school-level technology stock. However, the use of GPV technology vouchers was not
only limited to hardware purchases, they could also be used for any non-custom software,
evaluation tools, IT support services, and professional development services. It may be the
case that schools were investing in different types of technology resources to fit their specific
needs, whether it be more technology hardware, software, or a combination of the two, and
this is not detectable in an aggregate measure of hardware stock. Unfortunately, the SCA
does not provide data on all products and services approved and reimbursed at the district
or school-level, which could be used to determine exactly how schools were spending their
voucher.
I next explore whether voucher spending affected the composition of computer education
courses and other electives courses offered. Computer education courses may be an important
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input in the education production function, since the main purpose of computer education
courses, generally taught in middle school, is to prepare students for the computer skills
they will need to succeed both inside and outside of the classroom. Students in grades 6-8
are typically taught computer literacy and digital citizenship skills (e.g. common computer
terminology, navigation of the Internet, proper citations, on-line safety, etc), and Microsoft
Office Suite, including basic use of Word, Excel, PowerPoint, and Publisher.31 Gaining an
understanding of essential computer skills could lead to students becoming more productive
and efficient in a computer-based classroom, which could lead to an improvement in academic
achievement.
To determine if voucher spending impacts the number of computer education courses offered,
I use school year 2010-2011 school-level data from the CA Department of Education on staff
assignment and course data. These data include course information, like number of courses
offered, and course enrollment, as well as staff assignment information, like type of staff
and time base, for each type of course offered in a school. In addition to the common
four core courses taught in elementary and middle school (e.g., math, English, science,
and social studies or history), schools also offer elective courses. Elective courses allow
students to choose classes of more interest and to customize their educational experience.
While elementary schools offer electives to supplement the academic schedule, the freedom
to choose specific elective courses that complement the students’ own interests is typically
not available until middle school. Typical elective courses offered in middle schools include
art, foreign language, music (including band and chorus), computer education, and home
economics.32 Voucher spending could impact the types of electives offered. For example,
31See Rockaway Township Public Schools Computer Literacy Grades 6-8 Philosophy for an example of a
Computer Education curriculum: https://www.rocktwp.org/domain/17.
32Course information disaggregated by each elective offered is not available for all schools. That is, some
schools report the distinct number of computer education, art, and music classes offered, while others
aggregate the number of elective courses offered into an “other” category. Therefore, this analysis is
focused only on the schools that report the number of distinct elective courses offered. This limits the
number of schools within 10 percentage points of the 40% FRPM threshold considerably, thus this analysis
uses a bandwidth of 20 percentage points around the cut point to increase the precision of the estimates.
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if schools invest in more innovative and interactive computer education software, they may
be more likely to increase the number of and type of computer education courses offered.
That said, if schools increase the number of computer education courses offered, in order to
accommodate the increase, schools likely either decrease the number of courses provided in
other elective subjects, or increase resources allocated to computer education instruction.
Table 3.9 reports the results for the effect of technology voucher spending on the number of
computer education courses, and “other” elective courses offered. “Other” elective courses
offered includes art, drama, dance, music, foreign language, and home economics courses.
According to Table 3.9, voucher spending appears to significantly increase the number of
computer education courses offered by nearly 2.5 courses. However, voucher spending does
not appear to significantly decrease the number of other elective courses being offered. This
evidence suggests that since the composition of elective courses offered was not changing,
schools may have increased the amount of resources (e.g. teachers, classrooms, course mate-
rials, etc.) allocated to computer education instruction.33 Figure 3.8 panels (a) and (b) plot
the distribution of the number of computer education and other elective courses offered, and
corresponding regression estimates from Table 3.9. Visually, in Figure 3.8 panel (a), there
appears to be a discontinuity in the number of computer education courses offered.34
Next, I use these data to explore whether technology spending affects instructional time in
mathematics and English to determine if the positive achievement effects presented above
are driven by an increase in class time for these courses. Table 3.10 presents the results for
the effect of technology spending on instructional time in mathematics and English. The
estimates show that technology investment does not significantly impact instructional time
in mathematics and English courses, suggesting that the positive effects found in previous
33If schools were investing in more professional development, it may be the case that more teachers may
have become qualified to teach computer education courses.
34Across varying bandwidths, the estimate nearly falls to zero and is statistically insignificant (Figure 3.18,
panel (a)).
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tables are not driven by an increase in instructional time for these courses.35
Finally, it may be the case that the voucher program affected the teacher and student
composition of eligible schools, which could be driving the results presented in the tables
above. That is, if a high-technology school is more attractive for new teachers and students,
we may see an increase in the number of, and potential quality of, teachers in spending
schools, and a potential change in the student composition, if more involved parents choose to
locate in school districts with high-tech schools. In Table 3.11, I explore these hypotheses and
estimate the effect of voucher spending on a number of teacher and student characteristics:
the pupil-teacher ratio, the percentage of teachers with a minimum of five years of experience,
the percentage of teachers who are female, total student enrollment, and the percentage of
students who are female, white, black, and hispanic. The estimates in Table 3.11 show that
neither the teacher nor student composition in schools is changing as a result of voucher
spending, suggesting that the positive effects found above are not driven by teacher and
student characteristics.
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
Given the substantial increase in funds targeted towards increasing technology resources in
the classroom, an understanding of whether technology investment affects student achieve-
ment is of compelling importance. In this paper, I seek to provide causal estimates of the
impact of technology investment on student achievement. I exploit an exogenous change in
technology investment in California K-12 public schools generated by the California Educa-
tion Technology K-12 Voucher Program. The voucher program provided eligible schools, in
which at least 40% of students qualified for free or reduced-price meals, with general pur-
pose and specific category software vouchers for purchasing qualifying hardware and software
35The corresponding regression discontinuity graphs are presented in Figure 3.9, and corresponding varying
bandwidth figures are presented in Figure 3.19).
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products.
Using a regression discontinuity design and focusing on the schools that spent nearly all of
their technology voucher, I show that voucher spending had positive impacts on mathemat-
ics and English test scores for elementary and middle school students. Specifically, I find
robust evidence that voucher spending significantly increased English test scores, especially
among middle schoolers and low-socioeconomic students by one-third to nearly one-half of a
standard deviation. I also explore whether measurable inputs in education production were
affected as a result of voucher spending. I find suggestive evidence that voucher spending in-
creased the number of computers per student used for instructional purposes, and increased
the number of computer education courses offered. Taken together, the results of this study
suggest that technology investment effectively improves student achievement.
It is important to reiterate that the large findings in this study can be interpreted as upper
bounds of the effect of the technology voucher program on student achievement. Since this
analysis focuses on “early spenders” that spent nearly all the voucher within the first four
years of disbursement, the results of this study may not be generalizable to all schools, since
these schools likely differ on unobservable characteristics which may affect the productivity
of the voucher funds. Nevertheless, the findings presented here can still be used to assess
the impact of technology investment on student achievement.
Though the findings of this paper contribute to our understanding of whether technology
investment improves student achievement, they leave open the question of to what degree
additional funds for technology affect overall spending on technology. Due to data limita-
tions, this study is unable to determine whether the technology voucher program crowded
in or crowded out existing technology expenditures. That is, it may be the case that schools
were reallocating funds initially earmarked for technology to other productive inputs, such
as teacher salaries, or traditional instructional materials. However, since eligible schools
were required to have an approved education technology plan which clearly identified how
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technology was to be used to improve student performance, and how schools were going to
use existing funds to achieve this goal, it is unlikely that the voucher program crowded out
existing technology funds.36 Future work analyzing the effect of voucher programs should
examine if, and to what extent, voucher funds crowd in or crowd out existing technology
expenditures.
This paper also provides one important lesson for understanding the impact of technology
on student achievement. The findings of this study illustrate that technology investment can
play a sizable role in reducing the income achievement gap. However, this paper cannot speak
to the direct mechanism behind the large effects on achievement seen for low-socioeconomic
students. That is, this study is unable to determine if self-paced, individualized instruction
was the determining factor, or if it was teachers’ specialized use of technology resources, for
example, that improved achievement. Future research is needed to determine how exactly
technology investments can narrow the income achievement gap.
The results of this study inform the ongoing debate between those who encourage educa-
tional technology in schools and those who argue there is not enough evidence to support
the costly investments. The findings show that technology is an important input in the
educational production process, and can significantly improve elementary and middle school
student achievement, especially among low-socioeconomic students. Moreover, the costs of
technology investments are likely lower than those associated with other interventions that
improve student achievement, like reductions in class size (J. D. Angrist & Lavy, 1999;
Jepsen & Rivkin, 2009; Krueger, 1999). Given the enhanced efforts by education officials in
the U.S. to close achievement gaps and integrate technology into the classroom, the results
of this study should be acknowledged when deciding whether to implement technology in
36Indeed, anecdotal evidence also supports this hypothesis, with many qualifying school districts indicating
that funds initially earmarked for technology were not reallocated to other school inputs. Moreover, the
costs associated with maintaining technology in the classroom (e.g. replacing computers every 3-5 years,
and renewing software subscriptions) are fairly substantial, suggesting again that schools are likely not
reallocating funds away from technology.
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school classrooms.
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3.7 Figures
Figure 3.1: Balance in Predetermined Characteristics 1
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Notes: Balance in covariates around the 40% FRPM threshold: (a) School-level enrollment, (b) Percentage
of schools in a rural county, (c) Percentage of students female, (d) Percentage of students Hispanic, (e)
Percentage of Teachers with a minimum of 5 years of teaching experience, (f) Percentage of teachers who
are female.
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Figure 3.2: Balance in Predetermined Characteristics 2
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
Notes: Balance in covariates around the 40% FRPM threshold: (a) Pupil-teacher ratio (b) Percentage of
students White, (c) Percentage of students Black, (d) Baseline Math CST Scores, (e) Baseline English CST
Scores
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Figure 3.3: Density test
Notes: Density test of the number of schools on each side of the 40% eligibility threshold for the
2005-2006 school year.
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Figure 3.4: Evolution of the Sample
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Figure 3.5: Change in Mean Scale Scores from 2006 to 2011, Mathematics and English, all
Grades
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the Mathematics or English CST Mean Scale Score from
2006 to 2011 for elementary and middle schools combined. Free and reduced price meal (FRPM) percentage
is relative to the 40% cutoff (i.e. FRPM equal to 0 corresponds to a FRPM percentage of 40).
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Figure 3.6: Change in Mean Scale Scores from 2006 to 2011, Mathematics and English, by
Elementary and Middle
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the Mathematics or English CST Mean Scale Score from
2006 to 2011 for elementary and middle schools. Free and reduced price meal (FRPM) percentage is relative
to the 40% cutoff (i.e. FRPM equal to 0 corresponds to a FRPM percentage of 40).
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Figure 3.7: Technology Stock, Elementary and Middle Schools
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Notes: The dependent variables are the number of computers per student and the log of the number of
classrooms per school with Internet. Free and reduced price meal (FRPM) percentage is relative to the 40%
cutoff (i.e. FRPM equal to 0 corresponds to a FRPM percentage of 40).
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Figure 3.8: Courses Offered: Computer Education and “Other” Elective Courses
(a) (b)
Notes: The dependent variables are the number of computer education courses offered and the number of
“other” elective courses offered for middle schoolers. “Other” elective courses includes art, dance, drama,
foreign language, home economics, and music. Free and reduced price meal (FRPM) percentage is relative
to the 40% cutoff.
Figure 3.9: Percentage of Instructional Time, Mathematics and English
(a) (b)
Notes: The dependent variables are the percentage of time spent teaching mathematics, and English for
middle schoolers. Free and reduced price meal (FRPM) percentage is relative to the 40% cutoff.
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.1: Sample Means for Population and School Districts, 2005-2006 SY
Population Omitted
Districts
(±10)
Included
Districts
(±10)
p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel I: School Characteristics
Number of Schools 106.169 66.539 22.672 0.000
(219.315) (161.183) (18.134)
Enrollment 701.927 668.817 681.056 0.602
(320.163) (288.599) (299.831)
Rural 0.020 0.030 0.056 0.086
(0.139) (0.171) (0.230)
Percent FRPM 0.582 0.402 0.403 0.851
(0.284) (0.059) (0.056)
Observations 5,355 701 198
Panel II: Student and Teacher Demographics
Percent Female 0.486 0.486 0.484 0.226
(0.023) (0.025) (0.021)
Percent White 0.270 0.405 0.385 0.215
(0.245) (0.192) (0.208)
Percent Black 0.077 0.075 0.057 0.006
(0.106) (0.084) (0.056)
Percent Hispanic 0.514 0.351 0.375 0.092
(0.286) (0.167) (0.169)
Percent Teachers ≤ 5 yrs Exp. 0.257 0.223 0.242 0.093
(0.144) (0.136) (0.137)
Percent Teachers Female 0.817 0.826 0.813 0.190
(0.124) (0.119) (0.123)
Pupil-teacher Ratio 20.27 20.51 20.28 0.325
(2.694) (2.975) (2.460)
Observations 5,106 675 187
Panel III: Outcomes
Computers per Student 0.210 0.188 0.223 0.000
(0.101) (0.083) (0.116)
# Classrooms w/ Internet 35.74 32.07 38.28 0.002
(25.81) (17.79) (42.43)
Observations 5,351 701 198
English CST Score 338.8 348.6 347.8 0.498
(25.16) (15.31) (13.07)
Observations 5,450 724 198
Math CST Score 355.2 363.2 363.2 0.989
(33.17) (25.19) (23.37)
Observations 5,433 719 198
Notes: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are presented for elementary and middle schools only. Schools with enrollment
of less than 300 students are omitted. CST scores range from 150 to 600. Observations are the number of schools.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of Analysis Variables
Population FRPM -
10pp
FRPM +
10pp
p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel I: Technology Stock, 2010-2011 SY
# of Computers per Student 0.185 0.183 0.187 0.857
(0.131) (0.124) (0.151)
Observations 960 86 95
# of Classrooms with Internet 33.09 30.07 36.09 0.131
(22.64) (15.51) (35.07)
Observations 1,010 92 100
Panel II: ∆ CST English Scores, 2006-2011
Grades 2-5 15.33 12.63 10.89 0.211
(16.21) (17.06) (16.34)
Observations 3,147 304 277
Grades 6-8 19.36 17.03 20.21 0.058
(13.05) (11.78) (13.88)
Observations 1,047 108 137
Panel III: ∆ CST Mathematics Scores, 2006-2011
Grades 2-5 24.58 20.01 19.74 0.909
(29.36) (29.73) (27.80)
Observations 3,147 304 277
Grades 6-7 20.03 15.81 18.38 0.410
(21.04) (20.40) (20.73)
Observations 778 81 95
Panel IV: Other Outcomes, 2010-2011 SY
# Computer Education Courses 4.310 4.286 4.588 0.616
(2.637) (2.447) (2.271)
Observations 132 28 34
Instructional time - English 0.197 0.195 0.204 0.382
(0.074) (0.056) (0.067)
Observations 620 63 92
Instructional time - Mathematics 0.184 0.177 0.186 0.223
(0.061) (0.040) (0.048)
Observations 623 63 93
Notes: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are presented for elementary and middle schools only. CST scores range from 150 to 600.
Schools with enrollment of less than 300 students are omitted. CST mathematics test scores are only for grades 6-7, since students in grade 8
take the pre-algebra CST exam. Means for number of computer education courses are presented within 20 percentage points of the 40% FRPM
cut point. Observations are the number of schools, with the exception of English and Math CST scores. Observations for CST Scores are at the
school-grade level.
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Table 3.3: Effect of CA K-12 Technology Voucher Program on Test Scores
Mathematics English
(1) (2)
Voucher 4.4722 5.6855**
(4.3708) (2.5559)
Observations 715 779
Outcome Means for Control 18.16 13.16
(28.03) (15.72)
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the Mathematics or English CST Mean Scale Score from
2006 to 2011, for elementary and middle school grades combined. RDD estimates are reported using LLR
with a bandwidth of +/- 0.1 around the 40% FRPM cutoff. Regressions include controls for the number of
students tested, percentage of teachers with a minimum of 5 years experience, percentage of teachers who
are female, pupil-teacher ratio, total enrollment, rural, percent female, percent white, percent black, percent
hispanic, and grade fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the school-level are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.4: Effect of CA K-12 Technology Voucher Program on Test Scores, by School Type
Math, Elementary English, Elementary Math, Middle English, Middle
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Voucher 5.8642 3.6044 -0.8847 9.0885***
(4.8545) (3.1904) (6.5980) (3.3609)
Observations 549 549 166 230
Outcome Means for Control 18.94 11.95 15.23 16.63
(29.73) (16.83) (20.28) (11.34)
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the Mathematics or English CST Mean Scale Score from 2006 to 2011 for
elementary and middle school grades. RDD estimates are reported using LLR with a bandwidth of +/- 0.1 around the 40%
FRPM cutoff. Regressions include controls for the number of students tested, percentage of teachers with a minimum of 5 years
experience, percentage of teachers who are female, pupil-teacher ratio, total enrollment, rural, percent female, percent white,
percent black, percent hispanic, and grade fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the school-level are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5: Effect of CA K-12 Technology Voucher Program on Test Scores, by School Type
& SES
Math, Elementary English,
Elementary
Math, Middle English, Middle
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel I: Low-SES
Voucher 9.4545 4.5571 8.1526 11.0650***
(5.7879) (3.8684) (6.6900) (3.6545)
Observations 549 549 162 225
Outcome Means for Control 22.73 16.81 19.23 19.82
(32.98) (20.98) (20.49) (13.17)
Panel II: High-SES
Voucher 3.142 3.8457 -9.9044 5.2183
(4.8329) (3.1305) (7.3264) (3.8915)
Observations 537 536 164 227
Outcome Means for Control 21.32 12.46 18.45 18.32
(31.91) (18.17) (22.71) (13.67)
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the Mathematics or English CST Mean Scale Score from 2006 to 2011 for elementary
and middle school grades, by SES. RDD estimates are reported using LLR with a bandwidth of +/- 0.1 around the 40% FRPM cutoff.
Regressions include controls for the number of students tested, percentage of teachers with a minimum of 5 years experience, percentage
of teachers who are female, pupil-teacher ratio, total enrollment, rural, percent female, percent white, percent black, percent hispanic,
and grade fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the school-level are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.6: Effect of CA K-12 Technology Voucher Program on Test Scores, by Initial Com-
puter Stock
Math, Elementary English, Elementary Math, Middle English, Middle
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Voucher 3.2509 0.1451 -3.093 8.4674**
(6.1552) (3.9295) (6.5603) (3.2685)
Top Half of Initial Comp -3.4059 -3.5842 -0.306 0.69
(3.9101) (2.2338) (4.9376) (2.6955)
Voucher*Top Half of Initial Comp 6.1951 6.6285** 7.8556 2.3354
(5.3542) (3.3181) (7.0864) (4.1379)
Observations 549 549 166 230
Outcome Means for Control 18.94 11.95 15.23 16.63
(29.73) (16.83) (20.28) (11.34)
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the Mathematics or English CST Mean Scale Score from 2006 to 2011 for
elementary and middle school grades. RDD estimates are reported using LLR with a bandwidth of +/- 0.1 around the 40%
FRPM cutoff. Regressions include controls for the number of students tested, percentage of teachers with a minimum of 5 years
experience, percentage of teachers who are female, pupil-teacher ratio, total enrollment, rural, percent female, percent white,
percent black, percent hispanic, and grade fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the school-level are reported in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.7: Effect of CA K-12 Technology Voucher Program on Technology Stock
# of Computers per Student # of Classrooms with Internet
(1) (2)
Voucher 0.0533 0.1064
(0.0390) (0.1836)
Observations 182 184
Outcome Means for Control 0.181 30.09
(0.124) (15.49)
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of computers per student or the log of the number of classrooms per school
with Internet, for elementary and middle schools combined. RDD estimates are reported using LLR with a bandwidth
of +/- 0.1 around the 40% FRPM cutoff. Regressions include controls for percentage of teachers with a minimum of
5 years experience, percentage of teachers who are female, pupil-teacher ratio, total enrollment, rural, percent female,
percent white, percent black, and percent hispanic. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.8: Effect of CA K-12 Technology Voucher Program on Technology Stock, by School
Type
Comp/St - Elementary Internet - Elementary Comp/St - Middle Internet - Middle
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Voucher 0.0466 -0.2726 0.0307 0.6802**
(0.0505) (0.2303) (0.0540) (0.3267)
Observations 118 119 64 65
Outcome Means for Control 0.190 28.45 0.158 34.16
(0.136) (15.92) (0.086) (13.85)
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of computers per student or the log of the number of classrooms per school with Internet,
by elementary and middle schools. RDD estimates are reported using LLR with a bandwidth of +/- 0.1 around the 40% FRPM cutoff.
Regressions include controls for percentage of teachers with a minimum of 5 years experience, percentage of teachers who are female, pupil-
teacher ratio, total enrollment, percent female, rural, percent white, percent black, and percent hispanic. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.9: Effect of CA K-12 Technology Voucher Program on Number of Courses Offered
Computer Education Other Electives
(1) (2)
Voucher 2.481* 0.1686
(1.308) (3.0625)
Observations 59 59
Outcome Means for Control 4.4074 16.667
(2.4061) (12.845)
Notes: The dependent variables are the number of courses offered for computer education, art, drama,
dance, music, foreign language, and home economics courses in middle schools. Observations are the number
of schools. RDD estimates are reported using LLR with a bandwidth of +/- 0.2 around the 40% FRPM cutoff.
Regressions include controls for percentage of teachers with a minimum of 5 years experience, percentage of
teachers who are female, pupil-teacher ratio, total enrollment, rural, percent female, percent white, percent
black, and percent hispanic. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
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Table 3.10: Effect of CA K-12 Technology Voucher Program on Instructional Time
Mathematics English
(1) (2)
Voucher 0.0189 0.0091
(0.0157) (0.0190)
Observations 302 300
Outcome Means for Control 0.174 0.188
(0.040) (0.054)
Notes: The dependent variables are the percentage of class time spent instructing mathematics, and English
for middle schoolers in grades 6-8. Observations are at the school-by-grade level. RDD estimates are reported
using LLR with a bandwidth of +/- 0.2 around the 40% FRPM cutoff. Regressions include controls for
percentage of teachers with a minimum of 5 years experience, percentage of teachers who are female, pupil-
teacher ratio, total enrollment, rural, percent female, percent white, percent black, percent hispanic, and
grade fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.11: Effect of CA K-12 Technology Voucher Program on Teacher and Student Demo-
graphics
PT Ratio Teachers
≤ 5yrs
Exp.
Pct.
Teachers
Female
Enrollment Pct.
Students
Female
Pct.
Hispanic
Pct.
White
Pct.
Black
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Voucher 0.0686 0.0104 -0.0219 -28.7068 0.0098 -0.0002 -0.0081 -0.0001
(1.3204) (0.0271) (0.0183) (30.5648) (0.0066) (0.0161) (0.0193) (0.0060)
Observations 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182
Outcome Means 23.3 0.13 0.84 624 0.48 0.40 0.36 0.04
for Control (2.95) (0.10) (0.11) (239) (0.03) (0.17) (0.20) (0.05)
Notes: Observations are the number of schools. RDD estimates are reported using LLR with a bandwidth of +/- 0.1 around the 40%
FRPM cutoff. Regressions include controls for pupil-teacher ratio, percentage of teachers with minimum 5 years of experience, percentage
of teachers who are female, pupil-teacher ratio, total enrollment, rural, percent female, percent white, percent black, and percent hispanic.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.9 Appendix Figures
Figure 3.10: Examples of Qualifying GPV and SPV Products and Services
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Figure 3.11: Description of Datasets Used
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Figure 3.12: SCA Data Example
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Figure 3.13: District-level Distribution of Percentage of Voucher Spent by October 2010
Figure 3.14: Density Test, 2009-2010 School Year
Notes: Density test of the number of schools on each side of the 40% eligibility threshold for the 2009-2010
school year.
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Figure 3.15: Change in Mean Scale Scores from 2006 to 2011 by School Type, with Varying
Bandwidth
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the Mathematics or English CST Mean Scale Score from 2006
to 2011 for elementary and middle schoolers. Free and reduced price meal (FRPM) percentage is relative to
the 40% cutoff (i.e. FRPM equal to 0 corresponds to a FRPM percentage of 40).
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Figure 3.16: Change in Mean Scale Scores from 2006 to 2011 by School Type & SES
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the Mathematics or English CST Mean Scale Score
from 2006 to 2011 for elementary and middle schoolers, by SES. FRPM percentage is relative to
the 40% cutoff.
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Figure 3.17: Change in Mean Scale Scores from 2006 to 2011 by School Type & SES -
Bandwidth
Notes: See notes to Figure 3.17.
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Figure 3.18: Computer Education and “Other” Electives Courses Offered, with Varying
Bandwidth
(a) (b)
Notes: The dependent variables are the number of computer education courses offered and the number of
“other” elective courses offered for middle schoolers. “Other” elective courses offered includes art, dance,
drama, foreign language, home economics, and music courses. FRPM percentage is relative to the 40%
cutoff.
Figure 3.19: Instructional Time in Math, and English, with Varying Bandwidth
(a) (b)
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the Mathematics or English CST Mean Scale Score from
2006 to 2011 for elementary and middle schoolers. FRPM percentage is relative to the 40% cutoff.
131
3.10 Appendix Tables
Table 3.12: Effect of CA K-12 Technology Voucher Program on Technology and Test Scores
Computers per
Student
Classrooms with
Internet
Mathematics English
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel I: 80% Spending by 2010
Voucher 0.0261 0.2017 3.8782 4.5847**
(0.0298) (0.1839) (3.3489) (1.9395)
Observations 216 217 835 912
Outcome Means for Control 0.175 34.52 19.43 14.23
(0.129) (28.41) (27.75) (15.89)
Panel II: 70% Spending by 2010
Voucher 0.0218 0.1360 0.8161 3.1780*
(0.0261) (0.1521) (2.9258) (1.7013)
Observations 289 290 1,111 1,213
Outcome Means for Control 0.162 34.34 19.16 14.09
(0.121) (24.97) (27.11) (15.45)
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of computers per student, the logged number of classrooms with Internet, and the change in the
Mathematics or English CST Mean Scale Score from 2006 to 2011, respectively, for elementary and middle schools combined. RDD estimates are
reported using LLR with a bandwidth of +/- 0.1 around the 40% FRPM cutoff. Regressions include controls for the number of students tested,
percentage of teachers with a minimum of 5 years experience, percentage of teachers who are female, pupil-teacher ratio, total enrollment, rural,
percent female, percent white, percent black, percent hispanic, and grade fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the school-level are reported in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.13: Effect of CA K-12 Technology Voucher Program on Test Scores, ITT
Mathematics English
(1) (2)
Voucher -0.3181 0.9256
(2.4173) (1.4463)
Observations 3,348 3,637
Outcome Means for Control 19.63 14.37
(26.90) (15.19)
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the Mathematics or English CST Mean Scale Score from 2006 to 2011,
for elementary and middle schools combined. RDD estimates are reported using LLR with a bandwidth of +/- 0.1
around the 40% FRPM cutoff. Regressions include controls for the number of students tested, percentage of teachers
with a minimum of 5 years experience, percentage of teachers who are female, pupil-teacher ratio, total enrollment,
rural, percent female, percent white, percent black, percent hispanic, and grade fixed effects. Standard errors clustered
at the school-level are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.14: Effect of CA K-12 Technology Voucher Program on Test Scores, by School Type,
ITT
Math, Elementary English, Elementary Math, Middle English, Middle
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Voucher -0.789 0.478 0.5246 2.0457
(2.7160) (1.7076) (3.4012) (1.9726)
Observations 2,601 2,601 747 1,036
Outcome Means for Control 20.42 13.30 16.76 17.18
(28.46) (16.06) (20.00) (12.21)
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the Mathematics or English CST Mean Scale Score from 2006 to 2011 for elementary and
middle school grades. RDD estimates are reported using LLR with a bandwidth of +/- 0.1 around the 40% FRPM cutoff. Regressions
include controls for the number of students tested, percentage of teachers with a minimum of 5 years experience, percentage of teachers who
are female, pupil-teacher ratio, total enrollment, rural, percent female, percent white, percent black, percent hispanic, and grade fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered at the school-level are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.15: Effect of CA K-12 Technology Voucher Program on Test Scores, by School Type
& SES, ITT
Math, Elementary English,
Elementary
Math, Middle English, Middle
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel I: Low-SES
Voucher -0.7926 0.6195 1.3889 1.7961
(2.8910) (1.8070) (3.5642) (2.3071)
Observations 2,567 2,567 726 1,009
Outcome Means for Control 23.97 16.79 20.96 21.53
(32.20) (19.79) (20.70) (14.95)
Panel II: High-SES
Voucher 0.0657 1.3648 -0.9012 2.3195
(2.9117) (1.8020) (3.8331) (2.1593)
Observations 2,538 2,537 727 1,010
Outcome Means for Control 23.36 15.28 19.91 19.68
(30.37) (17.31) (22.68) (13.65)
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the Mathematics or English CST Mean Scale Score from 2006 to 2011 for elementary and middle
school grades, by SES. RDD estimates are reported using LLR with a bandwidth of +/- 0.1 around the 40% FRPM cutoff. Regressions include
controls for the number of students tested, percentage of teachers with a minimum of 5 years experience, percentage of teachers who are female,
pupil-teacher ratio, total enrollment, rural, percent female, percent white, percent black, percent hispanic, and grade fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered at the school-level are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.16: Effect of CA K-12 Technology Voucher Program on Test Scores, Placebo Thresh-
olds
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel I: Mathematics
Voucher 6.1267 -1.3122 -2.6388 4.4722 5.2479 -2.1271 6.278 -7.0245 0.6736
(4.5732) (4.8454) (4.7608) (4.3708) (4.6661) (5.1146) (4.6669) (5.4689) (4.6323)
Observations 600 573 642 715 803 885 871 822 777
Panel II: English
Voucher 2.4248 -1.4237 -1.4714 5.6855** 3.0503 1.5434 3.9464 -1.5813 0.5850
(2.2690) (2.5813) (2.3407) (2.5559) (3.0022) (3.3655) (2.5867) (2.8095) (2.5690)
Observations 635 617 692 779 878 954 930 870 810
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the Mathematics or English CST Mean Scale Score from 2006 to 2011 for elementary and middle
school grades. RDD estimates are reported using LLR with a bandwidth of +/- 0.1 around the respective FRPM cutoff. Regressions include
controls for the number of students tested, percentage of teachers with a minimum of 5 years experience, percentage of teachers who are female,
pupil-teacher ratio, total enrollment, rural, percent female, percent white, percent black, percent hispanic, and grade fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered at the school-level are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.17: Effect of Voucher Program on Test Scores, by School Type & SES, Non-spending
schools
Math, Elementary English,
Elementary
Math, Middle English, Middle
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel I: All
Voucher -0.0545 -4.7433 -5.2047 -4.6333
(10.0241) (5.7748) (11.1150) (6.3879)
Observations 249 249 81 119
Outcome Means for Control 18.78 15.66 21.11 17.77
(26.38) (15.60) (22.33) (12.09)
Panel II: Low-SES
Voucher 0.1469 -2.3863 -9.1932 -8.8901
(10.6348) (6.9453) (16.1421) (6.9679)
Observations 243 243 73 108
Outcome Means for Control 21.61 19.03 23.33 21.05
(31.62) (21.34) (24.60) (17.96)
Panel III: High-SES
Voucher -3.4198 -7.9539 -13.0733 -7.1942
(9.6935) (5.0952) (11.4922) (5.3207)
Observations 248 248 78 115
Outcome Means for Control 21.52 16.97 22.35 20.80
(26.43) (15.71) (23.34) (12.68)
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the Mathematics or English CST Mean Scale Score from 2006 to 2011 for elementary and middle
school grades, by SES. RDD estimates are reported using LLR with a bandwidth of +/- 0.1 around the 40% FRPM cutoff. Regressions include
controls for the number of students tested, percentage of teachers with a minimum of 5 years experience, percentage of teachers who are female,
pupil-teacher ratio, total enrollment, rural, percent female, percent white, percent black, percent hispanic, and grade fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered at the school-level are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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